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I. INTRODUCTION
We live in an explosive moment, during which our traditional
sense of community is in the process of "disintegrating."1 We know
where we came from, but not where we are going. Much like the Athe-
nian "democracy" described by Aristotle, ours had originally been re-
stricted to white male property owners, and this had a profound
impact on the shape, texture, and fairness of the resultant system.2
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEw and David Barnhizer.
* Professor of Law, Cleveland State University. I thank Sue Barnhizer, Veronica
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1. See, e.g., FRANCIS FUCyAmA, THE GREAT DISRUPTION: HuAiAu NATURE AND THE
RECONSTITUTION OF SOCIAL ORDER 5 (1999); WILLmi STRAUSS & NEL HowE, THE
FOURTH TURNING 203 (1997).
2. In Athens, the status of voting citizen did not include women, barbarians, aliens,
or slaves. See THE PoLrrIcs OF ARISTOTLE (Peter L. Phillips Simpson trans. 1997)
[hereinafter AmSTOTLE].
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Interest groups not part of the dominant system were excluded from
participating in the processes of power and governance other than in
subservient roles. There has been significant movement toward the
inclusion of disparate voices in our political system by which power
and opportunity are allocated, but it is a transition that is far from
complete even as we begin the twenty-first century. An inevitable
consequence of this greater inclusiveness is that we have entered a
period of profound disquiet in which new voices have arisen from all
directions to demand shares of social goods they feel have been
wrongly denied or to which they feel entitled. It remains an open
question which of the dynamic "micro-communities" of interest that
have emerged as cause and consequence of the opened system are ca-
pable of surviving or whether there will be a reaction sufficient to sup-
press or reconfigure some of the competing agendas. One undeniable
point, however, is that the terms of social discourse that had histori-
cally been restricted to a relatively narrow band of dominant interests
are unlikely to again exist in the United States.
In The Leviathan, Thomas Hobbes described six factors that lead
to the weakening, and even the dissolution, of a political community.3
Hobbes' factors are:
1. The belief that every private man is Judge of Good and Evil actions.
2. The belief that whatever a man does against his conscience, is sin.
3. The belief that Faith and Sanctity, are not to be attained by Study and
Reason, but by Supernatural Inspiration or Infusion.
4. The belief that he who has the Sovereign Power is subject to the Civil laws.
5. The belief that every private man has an absolute propriety in his goods:
such as excluded the Right of the Sovereign.
6. The belief that the sovereign power may be divided.4
My underlying thesis is that American society is in increasing dan-
ger of falling victim to the tendencies against which Hobbes warned,
and that we need to understand and deal with the ultimate implica-
tions this holds for our political community. Otherwise, we risk end-
ing up with a severe case of ideological balkanization that will
undermine and weaken our social system. My concern is that we are
well on the way to a state of ideological civil war. If we succumb fur-
ther it will mean a political culture in which there is little real commu-
nication, but only destructive vilification, jockeying for political
advantage, and a refusal or inability to make or accept the com-
promises and limits that are critical aspects of a working democratic
society. Even though dealing with these potential difficulties is im-
portant, the simple truth is that we would be wise to aim at strategies
that seek to mitigate the conflicts rather than pursue approaches that
seek to extinguish competing views and values of which we disap-
3. See THoMAs HOBBES, THE LEVIATHAN (C.B. MacPherson ed., Penguin Books
1968).
4. See id. at 363-68.
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prove. This is why ensuring widespread access to the adversary sys-
tem with its formalized rules of conflict is essential - essential for
virtually all positions and claims, not simply the most currently popu-
lar or politically powerful.
The profound import of the changes we are experiencing is difficult
to overstate. Many of the effects are being felt in the expanding de-
mands for rules and order being imposed on the legal system. Alan
Hunt argued that "[the central problematic ofjuristic theory has been
to provide a socially persuasive - that is relevant to a particular soci-
ohistorical situation - account of the grounds of legitimacy of the ex-
isting legal order and through that of the existing social order."5 Yet
at the point where we most need a "socially persuasive account" we
are in an increasingly intense situation of dispute and conflict over
what should be the terms of that account.
In analyzing the lamentable conditions he witnessed emerging in
Europe, Albert Schweitzer observed that we face one of the most criti-
cal challenges in our history.6 He warned that the sheer magnitude of
what we are experiencing represents a unique situation.7 If this
warning is correct, our history may provide less guidance in finding
answers than we would like. One of the most critical differences
Schweitzer and others have perceived is captured in his description of
the rise of ever more sweeping and pervasive institutional control over
our lives. While institutions have always played key roles in shaping
our lives and culture, the expansion of their dominance, capability and
persuasiveness, and the lack of positive behavioral values within the
primary secular institutions have combined into a profoundly dehu-
manizing and inescapable force.
In terms of understanding how we should deal with the social
transformation we have been experiencing for more than a generation,
Schweitzer argued:
[No historical analogy can tell us much. The past has, no doubt, seen the
struggle of the free-thinking individual against the fettered spirit of a whole
society, but the problem has never presented itself on the scale on which it
does to-day, because the fettering of the collective spirit ... by modem organi-
zations, [by] modem unreflectiveness, and [by] modern popular passions, is a
phenomenon without precedent in history.8
It is important to understand the implications of Schweitzer's three-
part analysis. The troubling difference he identifies is being powered
by not a single isolated factor but the powerful combination of dehu-
manizing institutional control with the enhanced techniques provided
by our "persuasion machinery." Added to this is the lack of deep and
5. ALAN HuNT, THE SOCIOLOGICAL MOVEMENT IN LAw 135 (1978).
6. See ERICH FRoMis, THE SANE SOCIETY 201-02 (1955).
7. See id.
8. Id.
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keen critical thought and the reliance on fads, stereotypes and unre-
flective political passions that have coalesced into a system that seems
incapable of being effectively managed or engaging in honest dis-
course. That is the context in which we are attempting to construct a
socially persuasive account strong enough to guide our difficult
choices. The problem, however, is that we cannot construct a substan-
tive moral account on which enough of us can agree. Given this reality
we must more than ever be willing to submit our disputes to mitiga-
tion and partial resolution through the processes of the adversary sys-
tem. We are caught within the dynamics of a culture whose primary
characteristics are conflict and change. For the foreseeable future we
must rely on the authoritative processes of the adversary system as a
central device by which that conflict and change are managed.
II. THE IDEA OF ORDERED CONFLICT
A premise developed in this essay is that ordered conflict is a nec-
essary, productive, and inevitable part of our society and that it is im-
plicit in the idea of ordered liberty. James Madison recognized the
need to balance competing interests in his analysis of factious groups.
Madison's insight rests at the center of my argument. In Federalist
No. 10, Madison set out the idea of faction in the following words:
By a faction I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a ma-
jority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common
impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to
the permanent and aggregate interests of the community. 9
Madison described two "cures" for faction. One is to "destroy the lib-
erty" that allows it to bloom, the other is to give "to every citizen the
same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests."1 0 He con-
cluded that both "solutions" are impractical. The truth, Madison ar-
gued, is that the "latent causes of faction are.., sown in the nature of
man, according to the different circumstances of civil society."1 Fac-
tions are natural and even necessary. The adversary system is the
mechanism by which we balance the inevitable and often healthy dis-
putes between factions. As our political system has become increas-
ingly complex and factious the adversary system's processes of
ordered conflict have become even more vital. If the truth be known,
most of us would prefer the noise and irritation of contention to the
silence and subordination of tyranny.
Ordered conflict is a desirable element of a free and diverse society,
not some lingering social disease that should be eradicated. There is a
virtue as well as a necessity in ordered conflict that serves vital social
purposes. The virtue of ordered conflict arises from a combination of
9. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 57 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
10. Id. at 58.
11. Id.
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the release of social tension resulting from the use of ritualized sys-
tems of dispute resolution and by the pressurized infusion of social
needs and ideas into an adversary process that achieves at least inter-
mediate or partial resolutions of disputes, even if only temporary. If
this is accurate, attempting to suppress conflict based on flawed and
idealized theories of human perfectibility and the illusion of an har-
monious society denies this essential aspect of our humanity and tries
to capture a genie in a bottle. Not only can it not be done, it should not
be done.
Madison was obviously not the first to appreciate the natural
stresses of human society. Conflict and disputes over comparative in-
dividual worth and principle are inevitable in any context within
which humans function. Hobbes told us:
[Mien have no pleasure, (but on the contrary a great deale of griefe) in keeping
company, where there is no power able to over-awe them all. For every man
looketh that his companion should value him, at the same rate he sets upon
himselfe: .... Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a
common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is
called Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against every man.1 2
In a somewhat less dramatic vein, Derek Bok, former president of
Harvard, suggested that competition "is very much a reflection of our
culture - we believe in competition .... [people like competition] but
they want a kind of wise restraint that is probably asking too much of
human nature."1 3 Nor are the competitive and acquisitive elements of
human nature recent developments. Lao Tzu observed well over 2000
years ago that "[it is the way of heaven to take from what has in ex-
cess in order to make good what is deficient. The way of men is other-
wise. It takes from those who are in want in order to offer this to
those who already have more than enough."' 4
The ordered conflict mediated by the adversary system offers
mechanisms for negotiating intermediate solutions needed for the in-
tegrity, resilience and elasticity of our social system. Even the con-
flicts produced by the tensions of expansive doctrines involving free
speech and others of an equally fundamental character aimed at al-
lowing the introduction of controversial positions in the face of the dis-
approval of dominant interests are essential forms of ordered conflict
designed into our adversarial system. This allows for the venting of
hostility that, if repressed by powerful interests that disapprove of the
particular position, tend to build up explosive internal stresses in
ways that weaken the spirit of the democratic system. Otherwise, the
intransigent value conflicts allow for no face-saving and compromise,
12. HOBBES, supra note 3, at 185.
13. William Glaberson, The Lawyers: Legal Gamesmanship May Take Toll (visited
Oct. 22, 2000) <http://www.nytimes.com/library/politics/092498clinton-le-
gal.html> (quoting Derek Bok).
14. LAO Tzu, TAO TE CHMnG 139 (D.C. Lau trans., Penguin Classics 1963).
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which renders a dynamic society brittle and fragile. Because our
deeper value-based positions require an external power to blame for
the compromises we make, we need to be able to point to an authorita-
tive source of power is capable of overawing us in a kind of "She who
must be obeyed" sense.
Thus, ordered conflict with its underlying threat of force serves im-
portant purposes. Our competitive disputes are symptoms of needs
that reflect our never-ending search for justice as well as our demand
for a greater share of goods to which we think we are entitled. Or-
dered conflict is the way in which we give a civilized voice to our anger
and perceptions of personal injustice. Ordered conflict is also a vital
method through which we negotiate our way through fundamental
and rationally incompatible disputes and through which we create ap-
proximations of solutions. Approximations of solutions are all we can
realistically hope to accomplish for many of our conflicts, because our
most critical disputes reflect the intersection of incommensurable val-
ues. There either cannot be a meeting of the minds on a rational or
evidential level, or there cannot be a full transition of the members of
one camp into another.15
At its foundation, the law is a political system that allocates social
goods, rights and obligations.16 Justice Blackmun began Roe v.
Wade 17 with Justice Holmes' dissenting observation in Lochner v. New
York: "[Tihe Constitution is made for people of fundamentally differ-
ing views .... ,,18 The legal system is not a self-contained theoretical
construct of ideal justice, but reflects, diffuses, and balances compet-
ing claims for political and economic power. In this vein, Roscoe
Pound told us that "[c]onflict and competition and overlapping of
men's desires and demands and claims, in the formulation of what
they take to be their reasonable expectations, require a systematic ad-
justment of relations, a reasoned ordering of conduct, if a politically
organized society is to endure."19
15. See THoMAs GREEN, THE ACTIVITIES OF TEACHING 43 (1971).
16. This is obviously not an original observation. For analysis, see John Finnis, Allo-
cating Risks and Suffering: Some Hidden Traps, 38 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 193 (1990);
David Luban, Incommensurable Values, Rational Choice, and Moral Absolutes,
38 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 65 (1990); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND
SOCIAL JUSTICE (1997). Sunstein offers the insight that "we value things, events,
and relationships in ways that are not reducible to some larger and more encom-
passing value. The second claim is that human goods are not commensurable.
By this I mean that such goods are not assessed along a single metric." Id. at 70.
He concludes that "efforts to insist on a single kind of valuation and to make
goods commensurable, while designed to aid in human reasoning, may actually
make such reasoning inferior to what it is when it is working well." Id.
17. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
18. Id. at 117.
19. Roscoe Pound, The Paths of Liberty, in NEW PATHS OF THE LAW 3 (1950).
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THE VIRTUE OF ORDERED CONFLICT
Like any political system, ours tends to be organized according to
how the most powerful interests define what they need and desire.
Among the most critical tools for acquiring and protecting political
and economic power are lawyers, legislatures, administrative bureau-
cracies, and judges. Control of these institutions of power and alloca-
tion of social goods is best achieved through adhering to the pretense
that these institutions are operating according to principles such as
fairness and justice, while informally using the institutions to serve
special interests. Thus, powerful institutions and private corporations
angered by the communal "truth-finding" judgments of juries either do
not admit their true motivations or attack populist juries directly.
These interest groups have sought to cloak their efforts to change the
rules of the system in language of fairness, the need to constrain
greedy lawyers, and the importance of "tort reform."20
III. IMPERFECTIONS IN THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM
Speaking of the virtue of ordered conflict does not suggest that
there are only positive aspects of ordered conflict. Jerold Auerbach
warned:
The legal process can be threatening, inaccessible, and exorbitant -usually it
is all of these for the least powerful people in society. It is more likely to
sustain domination than to equalize power. Litigation expresses a chilling,
Hobbesian vision of human nature. It accentuates hostility, not trust. Self-
ishness supplants generosity. Truth is shaded by dissembling. Once an ad-
versarial framework is in place, it supports competitive aggression to the
exclusion of reciprocity and empathy.21
20. See William Glaberson, Ideas & Trends: The $2.9 Million Cup of Coffee; When the
Verdict Is Just a Fantasy, N.Y. Tiaixs, June 6, 1999, at Al. Lawyers advance
their clients' interests in almost any way possible. This even includes using
strategies that consume and demean their own profession - such as the oft-pro-
claimed "litigation explosion." Glaberson reported that one scholar indicated that
"[t]he story of tort reform across the country is that it is one of the most carefully
developed and exquisitely executed political campaigns ever," and includes statis-
tics relating to the award of punitive damages - a main argument of the corpo-
rate defenders in their quest for legislative "reforms." Id. Glaberson asked:
Huge punitive damage awards, for example, have become everyday
events, right? Actually, a study of courts in the nation's 75 largest coun-
ties conducted by the National Center for State Courts found that only
364 of 762,000 cases ended in punitive damages, or 0.047 percent. OK,
but isn't it true that more and more liability claims are filed every year?
Actually, a study of 16 states by the same center showed that the num-
ber of liability suits has declined by 9 percent since 1986.
Id.
21. JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAw? vii (1983) [hereinafter AUERBACH,
JUSTICE WITHOUT LAw?]. Auerbach has described the evils of the social system
and legal profession. He recognized the severe limits of alternative approaches to
dispute resolution of the kind now being prescribed as cures for the deficiencies of
the adversary process-admitting the adversary system, while problematic, is a
necessary evil in an anonymous society which has increased greatly in its scale of
2000]
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Anne Strick, in Injustice for All, described the many problems of the
adversary system and argued that it subverts the justice it claims as
its purpose.2 2 All the criticisms are true to some extent. There are
numerous defects in the adversary system that must be challenged
and remedied. These include the tragic hypocrisy of the criminal "jus-
tice" system as well as the tendency of the most powerful interests to
capture the relevant parts of the system's operational machinery and
create rules that serve their own agendas. But in the conflicted and
complex political system in which we live there are no workable
alternatives.
While this situation falls dismally short of any social ideal, the
simple fact is that humans are a disputatious species. We dispute in
part because disputes are sources of acquiring power and defending
the positions of power we already hold. Many people dispute because
they enjoy the tension of conflict and competition. If grounds for dis-
puting did not exist in sufficient number, we would need to create
them. We dispute in order to be able to distinguish ourselves from one
another. We dispute to claim a greater "piece of the pie" and to ac-
quire status and a unique identity. The processes of social disputing
result in a splintering of issues into shards comprising increasingly
tinier pieces of the available social goods, but nonetheless create some
kind of social currency in which more people can take shares. This
actually creates new sectors of power and an even greater number of
micro-communities of interest and thus allows wider allocations of the
newly created splinters of power.
Conflict and competition should not be underrated as necessary
stimuli for change and growth. Edmund Burke wrote that challenge
is the force that drives us to improve through the necessity of in-
venting ways to overcome obstacles, observing that "[d]ifficulty is a
severe instructor, set over us by the supreme ordinance of a parental
Guardian and Legislator, who knows us better than we know our-
selves .... He that wrestles with us strengthens our nerves, and
sharpens our skill. Our antagonist is our helper."23 While such
Burkeian observations have fallen into disfavor in a culture that seeks
a kind of progressively perfectible and proper human, they represent
fundamental and relatively immutable truths of human nature. Diffi-
culty, challenge, conflict and competition are natural and essential
parts of being human. Because we do not want to see ourselves as
operation and lost any real sense of local and tight-knit community. See, e.g., id.;
JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE (1976). Locke and others have also de-
scribed the important role of the legal system as umpire. See JOHN LOCKE, OF
CIVIL GOVERNMENT SECOND TREATISE 67-68 (Henry Regnery ed., 1955).
22. See ANNE STRICK, INJUSTICE FOR ALL: How OUR ADVERSARY SYSTEm OF LAW VIc-
TIMIZES US AND SUBVERTS JUSTICE 124 (1977).
23. EDMUND Bu=uE, REFLECTIONS ON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 315 (Charles W. Eliot
ed., Harvard Classics 1909).
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base creatures and fear qualities we might think reflect that charac-
ter, we declare unacceptable aspects of our human nature to be elimi-
nated from our species through exercise of the power of reason.2 4
Ironically, as we become even more disputatious as a result of the in-
creasing diversity and stresses of our system, we seek a "return to
Eden" by advancing ideals of harmony and community that can not
work in our conflicted culture.
Joseph Schumpeter described the typical economic system as in-
volving a continuous process of "creative destruction" in which the
new system is created by the destruction of the old through an ongoing
series of cyclical bursts.2 5 While our history has been filled with peri-
ods of explosive transition, rarely has this been truer than at the be-ginning of the twenty-first century. Francis Fukuyama concluded
that the perceived social decay is not simply classic intergenerational
myopia, warning:
Although conservatives like William J. Bennett are often attacked for harping
on the theme of moral decline, they are essentially correct: the breakdown of
social order is not a matter of nostalgia, poor memory or ignorance about the
hypocrisies of earlier ages. The decline is readily measurable in statistics on
crime, fatherless children, reduced educational outcomes and opportunities,
broken trust, and the like.2 6
In The Fourth Turning, William Strauss and Neil Howe described
the changes in American society over the past decade:
Americans turned cynical, viewing every social arrangement as unworthy of
long-term loyalty, deserving only of short-term exploitation .... The sense of
civil decay developed a powerful momentum; the discrediting of each feature
of the civic landscape made the other features look all the more dysfunctional.
As institutions adapted to this changing mood, they became more finely tuned
to individual needs but worse at meeting (or even pretending to meet) commu-
nity needs. 2 7
In reading such laments it would be naive to think that our indi-
vidual moment of "modernity" is automatically different from all
others and somehow more intense and dramatic. This is an easy trap
in which to be caught. Clearly, change is a constant. The United
24. Maxine Greene develops this idea in a beautiful book. See MAXINE GREENE,
TEACHER AS STRANGER (1976). Therein, she describes the dichotomy that
emerged from Greek Rationalism, in which the rational part of our being is the
"higher" aspect, and the biological and emotive is the "animal" we must tame
through the power of Reason. Id. at 72. Rollo May, citing Ludwig Binswanger,
has called this philosophical split, "the cancer of all psychology and psychiatry up
to now." ROLLO MAY, THE COURAGE TO CREATE 49 (1975).
25. See JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 162 (1950).
Schumpeter offered the view that "[tihe capitalist process not only destroys its
own institutional framework but it also creates the conditions for another. De-
struction may not be the right word after all. Perhaps I should have spoken of
transformation." Id.
26. FuKuYAmA, supra note 1, at 5.
27. STRAUSS & HowE, supra note 1, at 203.
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States has witnessed such transformational events as the Revolution-
ary War, a vast movement to the Western frontier in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, the Civil War, and successive and continu-
ing waves of immigrants. We have seen incredible technological inno-
vations in transportation and communication, and experienced the
cultural transition from an agrarian society to an urban industrial
system, a change to suburbia in its post-industrial phase. We have
endured two world wars and many smaller conflicts. America has
muddled its way through the nuclear age and the Cold War, television
and the computer, as well as racial and gender revolutions. Yet, as
Schweitzer observed, there is something unique about the current pro-
cess of change. In part this has to do with the degree of penetration of
institutional control and institutional culture into our society. But it
also results from the reaction to institutional control that has emerged
as a consequence of the great expansion of the culture to include -
through law - interests that had been traditionally suppressed or lim-
ited to specific niches. Along with this expansion of law for purposes
of greater inclusion has been the increasing resort to converting al-
most every issue of consequence to legal currency because of the loss of
a core set of social values that had made such comprehensive legaliza-
tion of everything unnecessary.
The need for a strong adversary system has grown exponentially
over the past thirty years. This does not mean law was not needed
previously, but that in the past the political system had been able to
remain sufficiently closed or restricted. In our dynamic and conten-
tious culture we are engaged in fundamental political "wars" involving
deep and incommensurable value conflicts in which there is great an-
ger and very little room for compromise. Opposing interest groups
have increasingly brought their disputes into the realm of law, be-
cause they recognize that ordinary political processes are stale-
mated.28 The adversary system retains more of a sense of legitimacy
and fairness than can be said for other branches of government that
28. A recent article in The Plain Dealer demonstrates the confusion and anger of
ordinary citizens against legislators being captured by special interests. See Tom
Brazaitis, Initiatives Meet Defeat - Before Going to a Vote, THE PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland), July 23, 2000, at 21A. The frustration has led to the increased use by
citizen-based organizations of ballot initiatives to bypass legislators. The report
relates:
Convinced that their elected representatives are in the pockets of special
interests, Americans in the 24 states that allow ballot initiatives are try-
ing to take the law into their own hands on issues from animal traps to
universal health care.... But the very legislators the citizen-lawmakers
are trying to circumvent are making it difficult for them to get their is-
sues on the ballot.
Id. The legislators are shortening time periods within which petitions can be
circulated, increasing costs, and imposing technical requirements that often have
the effect of invalidating petitions.
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are seen as irretrievably captured by special interests. Many have
therefore sought the force and legitimacy thought to be provided by
legal rules and judicial decisions that favor their positions. The prob-
lem is that this shift to law and legal institutions in an attempt to
capture their decision-making processes has threatened the legiti-
macy of those institutions.
The struggle to control the institutions and key doctrines of law is
being fought from all sides. The judiciary is obviously one of the en-
dangered species. As the realization has grown that judges are key
makers of policy through their decisions, special interests have fo-
cused their energy and resources on the selection of the judiciary. The
cost of judicial campaigns has skyrocketed, and there is little question
that the integrity of the judicial institution is being compromised. 29
Conservative scholar Walter Berns observed, for example, in criticiz-
ing the effects of Roe v. Wade:
[Wihat were we taught by Roe v. Wade? That the Constitution is on the side of
the big battalions or, at least, the most strident battalions. That an up-to-date
judiciary is contemptible because it is nothing but a political body but, unlike
a political body.., it pretends not to be. And we were also taught the neces-
sity to form battalions of our own, which... is being done on a massive
scale.3 0
In such an explosive context, adherence to due process and willingness
to abide by the "fair" decisions of the legislative and judicial branch
are more important than ever, as is respect for the integrity of the
legal system. But we are seeing a kind of guerrilla conflict approach-
ing a Hobbesian civil war over the control of doctrinal rules of alloca-
tion, legal processes and authoritative decision-makers rather than
through democratic debate.
Consider the alternatives to an effective and independent judiciary
and the importance of preventing any single interest group from cap-
29. See William V. Dorsaneo, III, Opening Comment to the March 1999 Roy R. Ray
Lecture: Judicial Independence and Democratic Accountability in Highest State
Courts, 53 SMU L. REV. 255 (2000)(noting increased attention and criticism to
judicial elections in Texas); Donald W. Jackson and James W. Riddlesperger, Jr.,
Money and Politics in Judicial Elections: The 1988 Election of the Chief Justice of
the Texas Supreme Court, 74 JuDIcATuRE 184 (1991)(noting that financing of par-
tisan elections gives the appearance of impropriety); Orrin W. Johnson and Laura
Johnson Urbis, Judicial Selection in Texas: A Gathering Storm?, 23 TEx. TECH L.
REV. 525 (1992)(noting the problems of making judicial districts fair for minority
voting); Sheila Kaplan, Justice For Sale, COMMON CAUSE MAG., May-June 1987,
at 29 (discussing how special interest groups are influencing judicial elections);
Hans A. Linde, The Judge as Political Candidate, 40 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 1
(1992)(discussing how special interest groups are influencing judicial elections);
Justice Hugh Maddox, Taking Politics Out of Judicial Elections, 23 AM. J. TRIAL
ADvoc. 329 (1999)(stating selection retention removal should be separate from
political arena).
30. Walter Berns, Judicial Rhetoric, in RHEToRic AND AMERicAN STATESMANSHIP 47,
55 (Glen E. Thurow & Jeffrey D. Wallin eds., 1984).
2000]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
turing the judiciary. A recent New York Times report quoted a
Paraguayan citizen bewildered by what was happening in the nation,
who asked, "How can people believe in democracy?... How can they
believe in anything when the president simply decides to ignore an
order of the court and nothing happens?"31 The article goes on to sug-
gest that Paraguay "now has the trappings of democracy, with peri-
odic elections, a Constitution and separate branches of Government.
But there is little confidence in the independence of the courts and the
Congress." 3 2 Baruch Ivcher criticized the Peruvian government and
was driven from Peru. The facts of Ivcher's demise are, in his own
words:
Channel 2 in Lima, of which I was the majority shareholder, broadcast
reports on the use of torture by the intelligence service, military involvement
in drug trafficking and - this was the piece de r~sistance - the million-dollar
income of the head of the intelligence service, the Government of President
Alberto Fujimori apparently decided the station had to be silenced and I had
to be punished .... 33
This report of Baruch Ivcher's abrupt fall from grace reminds us
how crucial control of the levers of decision-making is to preserving
even approximations of fair processes of ordered conflict. In the
United States, the system depends heavily on the separation and bal-
ancing of governmental power. When one branch controls the others,
the essence of the Rule of Law is violated. This was made clear in
Peru where judicial independence fell to the power of the Executive.
It was reported in the New York Times that:
[t]o get away with these types of things [in relation to Ivcher and others] the
Government needs to control the entire judicial system. Today two-thirds of
Peru's judges have only temporary status, meaning that they hold their posi-
tions at the pleasure of the Government and cannot act independently. In ad-
dition, the National Magistrates' Council, an autonomous body established in
the Constitution to appoint and dismiss judges and prosecutors, has been
largely gutted.3 4
In the United States we have the same kinds of pressures to use gov-
ernmental power to abuse disfavored interests, but we are usually rel-
atively successful at blunting the attacks. In a case related to protests
about flag burning that had inflamed public passions, an ACLU
spokesperson commented that "ifiree speech is controversial. It's sup-
posed to be. If we all got along and toed the official line, we should
just pack our bags and move to Iraq."35
31. Diana Jean Schemo, Political Battle Threatens to Destabilize Paraguay, N.Y.
TIME S, Mar. 2, 1999, at All.
32. Id.
33. Baruch Ivcher, Editorial, Peru's Endangered Dissidents, N.Y. Tmis, Feb. 4, 1999,
at A27.
34. Id.
35. Flag Burning Spurs Debate About Access, THE PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), July 3,
1999, at 5B.
[Vol. 79:657
THE VIRTUE OF ORDERED CONFLICT
Formal conflict resolution procedures are rarely fully committed to
truth-finding. Anne Strick reached the conclusion that "the goals of
winning on one hand and truth on the other are mutually exclusive
* . ."36 While truth is not irrelevant, it is either not achieved or is
subordinated to a stronger priority. The processes are used to achieve
preferred outcomes. Those presenting their positions inside the for-
mal strictures of ordered conflict rarely lose sight of the fact that their
aim is to win, not to dispassionately offer all facts and arguments that
would allow an independent fact-finder to determine actual truth.3 7
Everyone is pursuing a desired outcome, and everyone is an advocate
for a particular position. Machiavelli warned that the prudent indi-
vidual must be cunning and deceptive, and that the prince must com-
bine the talents of beast and man in order to survive in a harsh and
deceptive world, because
a prudent ruler cannot, and must not, honour his word when it places him at a
disadvantage .... If all men were good, this precept would not be good; but
because men are wretched creatures who would not keep their word to you,
you need not keep your word to them.3 8
He continued, stating, "one must know how to colour one's actions and
to be a great liar and deceiver."3 9 He asserted that the prince "should
appear to be compassionate, faithful to his word, kind, guileless, and
devout. And indeed he should be so. But his disposition should be
such that, if he needs to be the opposite, he knows how."4 0
The inevitability of people behaving in this way is guaranteed by
the goals they seek. Nor are the worst problems for a society related
to the conflicts over material wealth - although conflicts over alloca-
tions of wealth and opportunity are important areas of contention and
dispute. The greatest threat to the social fabric involves the media-
tion of disputes over concerns that the competing advocates regard as
incommensurable. The degree of rational incommensurability in ar-
eas of fundamental conflicts over principles is reflected in Roe v.
Wade, in which Justice Blackmun wisely and deliberately avoided the
question of the point at which human life begins, observing that "We
need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When those
trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and the-
36. STRciC, supra note 22, at 24.
37. See id.
38. NicCOLO MACmAVELLI, THE PRINCE 99 (George Bull trans., Penguin 1961).
39. Id. Machiavelli tends to be misunderstood and certainly undervalued as a
thinker and strategist relevant to our time. See J.G.A. PococK, THE MACHIAVEL-
LiAN MoAENrr: FLoRFNTINs POLrncAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLAIc REPUBLICAN
TRADITION (1975); see also MICHAEL A. LEDEEN, MACHIAVELLI ON MODERN LEAD-
ERSHIP: WHY MACHIAVELLI'S IRON RuLEs ARE AS TIMELY AND IMPORTANT TODAY AS
FivE CENTurmEs AGO (1999)(discussing the value of Machiavelli's book, The
Prince).
40. MACHIAVELLI, supra note 38, at 99.
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ology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary... is not in
a position to speculate as to the answer."41
It has been almost thirty years since Justice Blackmun wrote those
words, and we still have not been able to answer the question from a
moral and political perspective. If change in fundamental values is
achievable at all in deeply conflicted areas such as abortion, it must
often occur over a generation or more based on experience and the
emergence of a new generation of citizens for whom the issues are not
as intense. It is almost impossible that this value shift through ra-
tional political discourse. Our inability to change through rational
discourse has little to do with truth, evidence or good faith. Change in
areas of fundamental disagreement will never be a fully rational pro-
cess because the advocates of the competing interests develop political
constituencies. Their identity and interest group allegiance is taken
from continued adherence to a particularly powerful stereotype and
social movement. Therefore, those who have pledged their allegiance
to a cause will not often surrender or modify their positions, both be-
cause they are conceptually unable to perceive the validity of new evi-
dence and because they are beneficiaries of their existing
commitments. 4 2 This inability to see the world differently occurs in
part because we need to believe deeply in something, and our beliefs
and commitments blind us. But, in many instances, political strength
is created by a political leader's professed view on a hotly disputed
issue. If the political leader changed positions, his or her power base
would disappear. If there were a serious attempt by an "honest" inter-
est group to engage in truth-directed discourse rather than political
advocacy, their opponents would use the truth against the group to
further their own purposes.
The virtue of ordered conflict must also be understood in the con-
text of managing the new form of social organization characterized by
disputing micro-communities and against the backdrop of the unique
character of the American culture. Much of the dynamic force that
has led to this fragmented situation has been supplied by our inability
to agree on allocations and entitlement to social goods on a basis that
41. 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973).
42. See David Ausubel, Cognitive Structure and the Facilitation of Meaningful Verbal
Learning, 14 J. OF TEACHER ED. 217 (1963). Ausubel reminded us that "existing
cognitive structure . . . [and] individual's organization, stability and clarity of
knowledge ... is the principal factor in the learning and retention of meaningful
new material." Id. The situation becomes even worse when we consider the bar-
riers of self-interest erected by the human mind. Bernard Cohen brought this to
the fore in his observation that "Max Planck... is often quoted to the effect that
'new scientific truth does not triumph by convincing its opponents and making
them see the light, but rather because its opponents eventually die, and a new
generation grows up that is familiar with it.'" I. BERNaRD COHEN, REvoLUTION IN
SCIENCE 467-68 (1985).
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relates to standards of merit. Nor is this surprising because merit is
itself a slippery and subjective measuring stick. While Aristotle em-
phasized the need to allocate social goods according to individual
merit, he begged the question by immediately describing the inability
of humans to evaluate their own merit objectively. 43 He instead con-
ceded our incapacity to judge our own and others' merit accurately
because of jealousy and self-interest.44
One cause of conflict, of course, is that people tend to place a higher
value on themselves and on the concerns they hold dear than is as-
signed by others, even when they are acting in good faith. But the
conflict is not only about achieving a fair level of material wellbeing.
Many people strive to acquire more, because that is how they acquire
higher status. As if disputes over our individual merit were not
enough, we rank ourselves by our power and status in hierarchies -
which for many is a form of derivative merit. We aim for ensuring
that, however defined, any standards of merit selected reward us -
most often at the expense of other communities of interest because
that weakens their status.45 Such outcomes relate to the fact that the
43. Our self-interest makes a mockery of Aristotle's "highest virtue" -justice. Aris-
totle stated that:
[Jiustice is often thought to be the greatest of virtues .... And it is
complete virtue in its fullest sense, because it is the actual exercise of
complete virtue. It is complete because he who possesses it can exercise
his virtue not only in himself but towards his neighbor also.... For this
same reason justice, alone of the virtues, is thought to be "another's
good," because it is related to our neighbour; for it does what is advanta-
geous to another, either a ruler or a co-partner.
THE NICHOMtACHEAN ETmICS OF ARiSTOTLE 108 (Sir David Ross trans., Oxford
University Press 1954).
44. Disputes over the priority and weight to be given different kinds of arguably mer-
itorious qualities are found even in simple democracies. Few will agree on the
terms of distributive justice or on the specific choices of merit that should govern
us. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 2. In discussing claims of entitlement to rule
others, Aristotle describes the disputes over who should be considered best and
most virtuous:
Mhe definitions on the basis of which people claim that they themselves
deserve to rule while everyone else deserves to be their subjects, are
none of them correct. For, in fact, even against those whose claim to
deserve control of the ruling body is based on virtue, multitudes would
have some argument ofjustice to make, as they would likewise against
those whose claim to deserve it is based on wealth.
Id.
45. Trying to avoid this dilemma is, of course, why John Rawls posited his "original
position." JOHN RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). In Rawls's "original posi-
tion," the persons creating the rules of allocation for society operated behind a
veil of ignorance that meant they did not know anything about their own position
in the society-to-be. See id. The thesis is that the rules would be fairer in order
to allow for better treatment in case they were one of the less advantaged mem-
bers of the new society. Rawls's device was artificial and hypothetical, as well as
impossible.
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standards selected as meritorious lead to greater or lesser allocations
of social goods.
This natural human tendency toward competitiveness and the ac-
quisition of wealth, power and status in relation to others often pro-
duces destructive forms of conflict. As Hobbes warned, without
structure and power to overawe us the lack of security creates a cha-
otic and unprincipled reality. That reality may be sometimes over-
stated as a Hobbesian "war of everyone against everyone." But very
recent history in Europe, Asia, and Africa suggests the tragic conse-
quences that occur without the existence of a sufficient civil "power to
overawe" - one that is simultaneously touched by a public perception
of its fairness and provision of citizen access. In so many political sys-
tems people are trapped in a culture and tradition without the Rule of
Law and are constantly at risk of violence and deprivation. While
some fringe enthusiasts of Social Darwinism might praise such a dy-
namic process as leading to the evolution of the human species
through struggle and the need for constant vigilance, few people
would actually choose to live in such an environment.
IV. THE ROLE OF LAW IN COPING WITH CONFLICT AND
SOCIAL CHANGE
The degree of penetration by a wide range of change agents into
American society is such that basic shifts in values and behavior are
now being experienced in virtually every area of human activity.46
Sandel described the problem as one in which the liberal and con-
servative debate
does not speak to the two concerns at the heart of our discontent. One [con-
cern] is the fear that, individually and collectively, we are losing control of the
forces that govern our lives. The other is the sense that, from family to neigh-
borhood to nation, the moral fabric of community is unraveling around us.
These two fears define the anxiety of the age.4 7
This unresolved anxiety has exacerbated already existing conflict
and strife dispersed widely through all our most fundamental social
and political institutions. Without the adversary system, we would
lack the ability to reach the intermediate solutions needed to mute
disputes based on fundamental differences in values and interest
group agendas. These intermediate solutions are achieved through
the process and authority of the mechanisms of the adversary system.
This operates either directly through decisions backed by implicit
force or indirectly through negotiated outcomes that would have never
been achieved absent the looming ultimate power of the legal system
46. Michael J. Sandel, America's Search for a New Public Philosophy, ATL. MONTHLY,
Mar. 1996, at 57-58.
47. Id.
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that comes into direct play only if the disputants fail to reach a
compromise.
The term "ultimate truths" is being used here to represent concern
about fundamental questions such as right and wrong, the nature of
good, justice, human nature, the role of the state and the extent and
quality of its power over individual members of the political commu-
nity, life and death. These are not mere abstractions. Ultimate truths
ground power and authority.48 Judgments of "truth" concerning such
matters are basic to how any society orders its activities. Particular
choices of ultimate truths infused into specific legal doctrines are po-
litical devices that are central to determining the allocations of power,
privilege, advantage, and disadvantage in society.
The conflicts are created because the ultimate truths are not neces-
sarily either true or ultimate. Even if the "truths" are accepted as
abstractly true, the character of law always changes in the processes
of its specific application. Law is created by its application to specific
contexts and becomes wholly real only then. The infusion of the terms
of the social dialogue in the context of a particular cultural moment is
one of the fundamental contributions of the adversary system. Only
in our attempts to apply the "truths" to specific contexts does it be-
come obvious that competing clusters of deep values are inconsistent
and strongly incompatible, even to the extent of being "enemies." Con-
flict is therefore created at the point when the ultimate truths of a
particular doctrine are being considered for infusion into doctrinal
rules that will consequently require action and impose sanctions and
rewards. This creates an inevitable tension that, badly managed, can
threaten the integrity and authenticity of a political community.
This, of course, is at the root of Hobbes's six factors that weaken a
political community, because our ultimate truths are grounded in
sources derived from our deepest belief systems. This means they are
not fully open to true dialogue or adaptation based on rational dis-
course and evidence.4 9 Our deep beliefs are judgments reached
48. See David Barnbizer, Prophets, Priests, and Power Blockers: Three Fundamental
Roles of Judges and Legal Scholars in America, 50 U. PiTT. L. REv. 127
(1988)(discussing ultimate truths)[hereinafter Barnhizer, Prophets]; see also
GEORGE P. FLETcHER, BASIc CONCEPTS OF LEGAL THOUGHT (1996)(analyzing ulti-
mate values).
49. Crane Brinton spoke of noncumulative knowledge in much the same way.
Noncumulative knowledge relates to wisdom, human nature, values and moral-
ity. Brinton stated:
Men ... make certain propositions, entertain certain ideas, about men,
about right and wrong action, about beautiful and ugly things. Over two
thousand years ago, men of letters were writing in Greek on these mat-
ters .... But our contemporary men of letters are today writing about
the very same things the Greek men of letters wrote about, in much the
same way and with no clear and certain increase in knowledge.
CRANE BRINTON, IDEAS AND MEN: THE STORY OF WESTERN THouGHT 13 (1950).
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through a variety of paths. These include sustained and substantial
experience and study, and informed and uninformed choice. But the
paths also include propaganda and inculcation, and in the general
community those are far more likely sources of "knowledge." This
makes it very important to understand the "ultimate truths" as vital
tools of power because they are based in a deep-rooted human need to
cope with conditions with which we must constantly struggle but can-
not consciously understand or answer in any empirical sense. Ulti-
mate truths are primary sources of the competing premises
underpinning our system of law and legal doctrine.
It is impossible to have fully rational discourse in a complex com-
munity. The dilemma is that the deep value systems upon which the
ultimate truths are grounded are not rational or even necessarily con-
sistent with other clusters of belief containing potentially competing
deep values. Thomas Green warned that we hold within us multiple
and frequently inconsistent value systems and beliefs.50 He sug-
gested that we hold our value systems, not as an integrated and seam-
less whole, but in independent clusters that allow the holding of
incompatible beliefs.51 These are resistant to the infection of fact and
evidence, depending on the particular area of activity.52
Humans necessarily hold critical aspects of their lives and beliefs
in compartments, because this helps to mute the conscious conflict be-
tween our incommensurable systems of thought and behavior. In
other words, the ideal of the fully integrated person is an impossible
fiction because we have so many different roles to play and responsi-
bilities to fulfill. Hypocrisy, self-deception, and knowing when not to
pursue a line of inquiry are invaluable tools for ordinary life. Individ-
uals possess incompatible systems of valuation operating deeply
within themselves. Some of these incompatible systems are legiti-
mate and necessary. Others are inadequate and even warped. Ernest
Becker has written of the "delicately constituted fiction" of human as-
piration, saying:
The world of human aspiration is largely fictitious and if we do not under-
stand this we understand nothing about man . . . . Man's freedom is a
fabricated freedom, and he pays the price for it. He must at all times defend
the utter fragility of his delicately constituted fiction, deny its artificiality.5 3
The conflicts are concerned with the answers to the "ultimate
truths" through the power of the legal system. Frederick Rodell re-
minded us almost seventy years ago that "law [is] ... the only alterna-
tive to force as a means of solving the myriad problems of the world."54
50. GREEN, supra note 15, at 43.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. ERNEST BECKER, THE BIRTH AND DEATH OF MEANING 139 (2d ed. 1971).
54. Frederick Rodell, Goodbye to Law Reviews, 23 VA. L. REv. 38, 43 (1936).
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But, although we are in an era in which the legitimate and illegiti-
mate demands for change through law have expanded enormously, we
run the risk of undermining the authority and legitimacy of law itself.
Aristotle warned, for example, that legal doctrine should not be al-
tered too rapidly because "the law has no power to command obedi-
ence except that of habit, which can only be given by time, so that a
readiness to change from old to new laws enfeebles the power of the
law."5 5 But it is impossible for law and its primary instrument of dis-
pute resolution - the adversary system - to hide from the strongest
demands of its citizens. And those citizens are at each other's meta-
phorical throats over powerful issues of both distributive and correc-
tive justice.5 6 The law, and therefore its adversary mechanism, is
being asked to mediate demands that are in many ways
incommensurable.
Donald Elliott wrote that "[1]aw is a scavenger. It grows by feeding
on ideas from outside, not by inventing new ones of its own."57 But
law is also more than a scavenger. Law scavenges in a purposeful way
to satisfy its needs. Those needs are determined in reaction to social
demands that certain conflicts be resolved. Law's rules for "scaveng-
ing" are focused on coping with intense social disputes that have risen
to such a level of intensity and awareness that some kind of action is
required. It is the adversary system that offers the voice and the pro-
cess through which the competing social interests can duel over the
appropriate allocation of social goods. Of course, it does not only in-
volve the decisions and doctrines of courts. Part of the battle is being
fought in the legislative context in which particular rules of allocation
are sought by the competing interest groups. But even here, the legis-
lative activity uses the principles on which the Rule of Law is
grounded to attempt to establish the key rules that will be applied
through enforcement and adversarial disputing. Roscoe Pound de-
scribed the role of law in the process, asserting that "[1]aw must be
stable and yet it cannot stand still .... [A1ll the writing about law has
struggled to reconcile the conflicting demands of the need of stability
and the need of change .... If we seek principles, we must seek prin-
ciples of change no less than principles of stability."58
The adversary system helps the members of our fragmented politi-
cal system assert their grievances through law and to defend against
55. ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, at 58.
56. See FRANCIS CANAVAN, THE PLURALIST GAME: PLURALISM, LIBERALISM, AND THE
MORAL CONSCIENCE (1995); CHALLENGES TO THE ENLIGHTENMENT: IN DEFENSE OF
REASON AND SCIENCE (Paul Kurtz & Timothy J. Madigan eds., 1994); Louis
MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK V. TUsHNET, REMNANTS OF BELIEF: CONTEMPORARY
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES (1996).
57. E. Donald Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition in Jurisprudence, 85 COLUM. L.
REv. 38 (1985).
58. ROSCOE POUND, LAw FINDING THROUGH EXPERIENCE AND REASON 23 (1960).
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others' grievances against them. The disputes are increasing. This
process of disputing is collectively good in many ways and necessary in
any event, but it is painful for people dependent on what is being de-
stroyed or supplanted by the system's decisions that create new rules
of allocation. It results in real winners and losers. For many people
on the losing end, it represents the end of the world they have known
and the beginning of one in which they are rudderless and adrift. In
such a dynamic culture, there is a constant tension between those
seeking to take advantage of change and those seeking to preserve the
existing system or to protect their particular share of social and eco-
nomic goods. This clash produces intense conflict, which is not sur-
prising, given the consequences for the eventual winners and losers
and the reallocations of power the dynamic of transformational
change imposes. But if we put stock in ideas such as Schumpeter's
claim that transforming changes are inevitable and to some degree
natural, the conflicts and their intermediate resolutions are critical
elements of the system's survival and overall health. In this sense,
the resolutions resulting from ordered conflict can be claimed to be
often virtuous because they may advance fairer treatment of previ-
ously disenfranchised groups, or at a minimum will at least be of func-
tional importance in managing the political system according to
legitimate principles.
Of course, in claiming there is a virtue in ordered conflict, all forms
of conflict are not included. The focus here is with the role of the ad-
versary system as a part of the facilitation of ordered conflict within a
complexly democratic political system such as is comprehended within
the ethos commonly called the "Rule of Law."5 9 This is consistent with
John Finnis's suggestion that law is a "cultural object, constructed or
posited by creative human decision ... an instrument ... we adopt
because we have no other way of agreeing amongst ourselves over sig-
nificant spans of time about precisely how to pursue our moral project
well."60 He went on to describe law as providing
algorithm[s] for deciding as many questions as possible .... As far as it can,
the law seeks to provide sources of reasoning - statutes and statute-based
rules, common law rules, and customs - capable of ranking (commensurat-
ing) alternative dispute resolutions as right or wrong, and thus better or
worse.
6 1
The algorithms of law can be found in the structure and content of
legal doctrines, which are the formulas judges (and even legislators)
apply to the judging of disputes that find their way into the adversary
system to the point that decisions are required.6 2
59. John Finnis, Natural Law and Legal Reasoning, 38 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 6 (1990);
see generally JOHN FINNIs, NATuRAL LAw AND NATuRAL RIGHTS (1980).
60. Finnis, supra note 59, at 6.
61. Id.
62. A structure of legal doctrine is offered at the end of this essay.
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The adversary system is comprised of mechanisms for dispute reso-
lution such as negotiation, mediation, arbitration and trial. Judges,
lawyers, legislators, and even academics have critical responsibilities
within the system. The particular mechanism or actor is not the de-
fining characteristic of the adversary system as opposed to the under-
lying ability to resolve the dispute authoritatively through the power
of the state. The adversary system therefore depends on certain basic
elements. These include the implicit authority of force, an authorita-
tive decision-maker if disputants cannot otherwise agree, a process of-
fering some degree of fairness, the ability to resort to advocates to
voice disputants' positions, and an intelligible set of legal rights and
duties. These elements obviously create a system of ritualized and
managed conflict as a substitute for private and unmitigated violence.
In arguing the "virtue" of ordered conflict of the kind that allows real
societies to endure, it should be clear that this is not an endorsement
of private violence. Nor am I claiming that ordered conflict as man-
aged through the adversary system is cost-free in terms of what it
does to us. But the alternatives are worse.
V. THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM IN A COMPLEX
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
Aristotle described democracy as a corrupt form of government. 6 3
Athenian democracy was an imperfect form of government even in the
essentially tribal-level culture reflected in Aristotle's Athens. It was
based in a simple and homogenous male-enfranchised Athenian city-
state and was never contemplated to work in a large-scale or complex
political community. 64 Aristotle clearly recognized the inherent limi-
63. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, at 89, 207-45 (discussing the attributes of various
forms of political regimes); see generally EMILY HAUPTMANN, PUTTING CHOICE
BEFORE DEMOCRACY: A CRITIQUE OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY (1996); MORTON A.
KAPLAN, LAW IN A DEMOCRATIC SociETY (1993); THE RULE OF LAW (Ian Shapiro
ed., 1994).
64. Aristotle warned that "Ithere is a limit to the size of a city just as there is to
everything else ... For if any one of these is either too small or too large in size, it
will not have the power that belongs to it but will sometimes wholly forfeit its
nature and sometimes be in a base condition." ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, at 123.
Aristotle urges that the size and composition of a city-state is important because:
A city's acts are those of its rulers and of its ruled subjects, and the work
of the ruler is to command and pass judgment. But with respect to pass-
ing judgment on matters of justice and distributing offices according to
merit, the citizens must know what each other is like, for where it hap-
pens that they do not, these matters ofjudgment and offices must be in a
base condition. For it is not just to decide them in an offhand way, but
that is manifestly what happens where there are many people. Further,
foreigners and resident aliens could easily get a share in the regime be-
cause, given the excessive numbers, escaping detection will not be hard.
Id. at 124. Compare this with Jerold Auerbach's observation that we have lost
the connection between community and law because the urban environment has
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tations and potential abuses of the democratic system even when oper-
ating on the limited scale and relative homogeneity of the Athenian
community. But while recognizing its potential for abuse and imper-
fection, Aristotle nonetheless concluded that on balance the flawed
system of democracy might be reasonably close to the best form of gov-
ernment humans were capable of creating.6 5 Even in its small and
homogenous form, the democracy represented by Athens was depen-
dent on the ability of citizens to be able to present their views and
positions and to be heard by other citizens and by decision-makers.
Disagreements and disputes filled Athenian life. Lawyers, oratory,
rhetoric, and advocacy were a central part of the Athenian
democracy.6 6
It is obvious that Americans do not live in a simple city-state de-
mocracy. We inhabit an incredibly diverse and complex system that
we very loosely and often inappropriately describe as democratic and
that mixes the participatory principles of citizen democracy with the
greater scale of constitutional republicanism. The United States is
more accurately understood if its federalist system of government is
thought of as a "domestic empire" uneasily contained within its far-
flung national borders. But if adversity and the provision of a "citizen
voice" were imperative parts of even a simple democracy operating on
a small scale and with a far more homogenous culture, such as Ath-
ens, the need for effective advocacy is greatly multiplied in our com-
plex republican democratic system in which it is even more difficult
for one's voice to be heard.67
At some point the sheer numeric magnitude of a political system
produces its own complications in terms of system manageability. In-
stitutional scale generates complexities and an increased need for in-
terest groups to be heard in order to avoid being drowned out by the
cacophony of competing voices. The combination of scale and complex-
ity produced by the collision of radically different philosophical, moral,
and religious beliefs - and the insistence by the holders of those collid-
reached a scale and degree of residential transitoriness that no one knows much
of anything about each other. See AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAw?, supra note
21.
65. He concludes that even with its numerous flaws, democracy is the best real op-
tion. The three true forms of government were kingly rule, aristocracy, and con-
stitutional government. The three corrupted forms were tyranny, oligarchy, and
democracy. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 2, at 58. Aristotle considered democracy
the best form in the real world because it had the greatest likelihood to serve the
common good of all citizens while the other forms all tended toward the interests
of specific classes. See id.
66. See, e.g., BRANDT AYMAR & EDWARD SAGARIN, A PICTORAL HISTORY OF THE
WORLD'S GREATEST TRIALS: FROM SOCRATES TO EICHMANN 1-13 (1967)(discussing
Athenian dispute resolution).
67. See AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAw?, supra note 21.
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ing beliefs that they be recognized as legitimate - makes it imperative
that social mechanisms allow for the release of internal pressures.
What is being described as the uniquely American form of govern-
ment we call democracy is a result of the combination of population
size, complexity and diversity. Jerold Auerbach warned that our ur-
ban environment renders us virtual strangers to each other, meaning
there is little awareness of individual merit or sense of community.
This has destroyed any sense of being a tightly knit community capa-
ble of causing us to fear expulsion from the community or some other
sanction based on group disapproval. Such a context of anonymity al-
ters behaviors and attenuates the possibility of accountability in ways
that we are still trying to grasp. At the same time, as I suggest in the
context of special interest micro-communities, those who are alienated
in terms of the geographic, residential and employment environments
that have historically provided us with our sense of community are
creating different kinds of communities. These communities of inter-
est do have some power over their members' behavior. But the new
micro-communities are based on interests, not residence or
employment.
Once a system moves beyond an easily manageable and relatively
small-scale common culture in which there are shared values and a
governing ethos in which the sources of authority are.respected and
laws are jointly understood, even if not reduced to written form, the
political marketplace becomes much more competitive. But it is a
marketplace - not of ideas but of power and influence - in which the
discourse is outcome-directed rather than rational. While this is inev-
itable in the political arena, it is even truer when one of the few strong
values of that enlarged political community is the competitive free
market in which challenge, pursuit of opportunity, and an ideology of
wealth-seeking dominate. 68 In such an environment, achieving a de-
sired outcome depends on having the ability to make your positions
heard by the system's decision-makers to the degree that you increase
the likelihood they will give you what you desire. But truth is a victim
in such a process. This led Jules Henry to conclude that the value
systems and institutions of the twentieth century have somehow re-
versed the truth-seeking spirit of several millennia - essentially re-
sulting in a culture of lies. He argued that "[olne of the discoveries of
the twentieth century is the enormous variety of ways of compelling
language to lie."6 9
68. In criticizing the effects of market-morality, Jules Henry argues that "[tihe heart
of truth in pecuniary philosophy is contained in the following three postulates:
Truth is what sells. Truth is what you want people to believe. Truth is that
which is not legally false." JULES HENRY, CuLruxE AGAINST MAN 50 (1965).
69. Id.
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In simpler political systems, custom and shared values play signifi-
cant roles in avoiding and resolving disputes. As a political system
becomes larger and more diverse, strong shared values are diluted or
are forced to compete with equally strong beliefs, and customary
knowledge of the kind required for an entire community to behave in a
consistent manner disappears. This creates a vacuum empty of com-
monly shared values with significant consequences for the political
system, which increasingly leads to a dependence on law. Lawrence
Friedman captured the role of law in a complex democracy. In his
classic, American Law, Friedman stated: "In complex societies custom
is too flabby to do all the work - to run the machinery of order. Law
carries a powerful stick: the threat of force. This is the fist inside its
velvet glove. ."7o He continued by asserting that
law and ... courts stand at the very core of crucial decisions in the United
States. These decisions concern policy in many spheres of life, including the
major social questions and such sticky issues as obscenity, abortion, sexual
deviancy, personal morality, and drug laws - in short, the whole social
revolution.
7 1
While the adversary system was a central part of the simple Athe-
nian democracy, it is far more necessary in the diverse American sys-
tem. But if the adversary system is vital to our American democracy,
what are its most essential contributions? The answer must begin
with the premise that law is an admixture of substance, morality,
human nature, and process. At its heart it is a tacit system by which
we more or less agree to manage our affairs in a conflicting commu-
nity and abide by decisions - even (or particularly) when we do not
like them. Our willingness to abide is based on the habit of obedience
to rules, on fear of the consequences if we do not obey, and on respect
for legal and political institutions.
An important part of our willingness to accept the decisions of legal
decision-makers as authentic and authoritative is that the system is
sufficiently open, and it provides multiple pathways that allow us to
bring the issue back through the process of democratic decision mak-
ing for reconsideration in some form.72 This is reflected in John Fin-
nis's argument that:
Political authority in all its manifestations, including legal institutions, is a
technique for doing without unanimity in making social choices - where una-
70. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERIcAN LAW 257 (1984).
71. Id.
72. Leaving open pathways through which unpopular decisions can potentially be
altered is an important part of our system, presumably under the heading of
"hope springs eternal." In fact, our system of doctrine is based on the ability to
change. Bruce Ackerman reminds us that "it is most unlikely that a court will
accept a novel legal argument on its initial presentation. Most probably, such an
enterprise will only serve to win somebody else's case ten or twenty years from
now .... " Bruce Ackerman, The Marketplace of Ideas, 90 YALE L.J. 1131, 1139
(1981).
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nimity would almost always be unattainable or temporary - in order to se-
cure practical unanimity about how to coordinate our actions with each other,
which, given authority, we do simply by conforming to the patterns authorita-
tively chosen.7 3
Law is therefore a buffer between the raw force of violent actions
we might otherwise take to achieve our interests or to avenge wrongs
against us, and a commitment to subordinating our most selfish or
aggressive instincts to a process during which we either accept our
fates and adjust our positions and behavior accordingly, or organize
and work toward achieving our goals in legal ways. The means
through which one interest group seeks to attain its goals at the ex-
pense of another includes obtaining favorable legislation and interpre-
tations of legal doctrine by judges. This also involves supporting
defensive struggles aimed at preventing opponents from being suc-
cessful in dominating the legal rules governing the area of conflict and
therefore being able to impose their preferences. If we are unwilling
to accept the system's authoritative judgments, we may attempt to
convince legislators to reverse or amend relevant statutes or seek con-
stitutional amendments. We may lobby to create or revise special ad-
ministrative regulations or request executive orders or other executive
actions that advance our goals. We may try to have the decisions of
lower courts reviewed and reversed on appeal. Or as many are doing
in the context of abortion, we may exercise our legal rights to protest,
picket, educate, and seek to have new decision-makers elected or ap-
pointed who share our views. 74
For law to continue to serve its buffering function in our complex
system of political organization, certain conditions must be met.
While these conditions shift in weight and intensity, they are all nec-
essary pieces of the dynamic organic system of law. The weakening of
any element creates risks to the quality of the other elements and the
perceived legitimacy of the social order. Compare these considera-
tions with the conditions that exist in the most hotly disputed areas of
controversy. They relate to fundamental qualities of value, fairness,
institutional respect, access to the system, and the effects of religious
belief. Such factors are at the heart of the Rule of Law. These condi-
tions of law's legitimacy include:
1. Belief in the foundations of value underpinning the law;
2. Respect for the ends served by the law;
3. Understanding the power behind the law;
4. Reasonable congruence between the law and individual
principles;
73. Finnis, supra note 59, at 6.
74. See, e.g., Tmi LAHAYE, THE BATrLE FOR THE MNDM 19-20 (1980)(suggesting the
need to elect public officials with "sufficient moral sanity to pass laws prohibiting
the distribution of corrupting materials").
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5. Non-conflict with fundamental beliefs;
6. Awareness of the consequences of a "loss of law";
7. Respect for the institutions that apply the law;
8. Belief in the fairness of the law's application;
9. Fear of sanctions if the law is violated;
10. Availability of the law to advance one's legitimate ends; and
11. Openness of the legal institutions to alternative views.
Consider the above factors in the context of Hobbes' previously de-
scribed six factors that weaken a political community and in the con-
text of the improbability there can be a rational meeting of the minds
as opposed to a submission to authority on issues such as abortion,
capital punishment, racial and other forms of discrimination, and the
limits of using government power in defining the rights or behaviors of
individuals. Consider the possibility of a meeting of the minds on dis-
putes relating to such concerns as weapons, drug use, pornography
and obscenity, "hate crimes," free speech, censorship, property owner-
ship, and privacy. These conflicts are not simply points of reasoned
contention among fully rational interest groups. They are fundamen-
tal, volatile, and occasionally violent points of intersection of the most
deeply held value systems on the part of individuals and institutions
maneuvering to impose their view on others.
The intensity of the conflicts in America is suggested in a recent
article describing how United States anti-abortion activists are ex-
tending their views into Canada. Colin Nickerson reported: "U.S. an-
tiabortion groups are increasingly engaging in direct anti-abortion
crusades north of the border."75 Additionally, "[a] campaign of vio-
lence and intimidation against doctors who perform abortions has suc-
ceeded in shutting down Canadian abortion clinics and frightening
physicians so effectively that the procedure is becoming extremely dif-
ficult to obtain in many parts of the country."7 6 Consider the meaning
of bombings of abortion clinics, murders of doctors who perform abor-
tions, whites who kill blacks simply because of skin color, blacks who
kill whites simply because of skin color, arson attacks on churches,
and much more.
Even if making political discourse a kinder and gentler process was
a desirable goal - which it is not in our complex political system -
virtually all of the system's incentives compel a different outcome.
The challenge of altering the competitive spirit of political struggle is
far beyond our abilities - even if the obstacles were only economic, and
they are not. The combination of economics, ego, competitive behav-
ior, and the conflicting nature of the goals sought by members of our
75. Colin Nickerson, Attacks, Intimidaton [sic] Make Abortion Rare in Canada, THE
PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), July 15, 2000, at 3A.
76. Id.
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society make it close to impossible for our fundamental disputes to be
resolved by cooperative means. Our resolution process requires an ad-
vocate's voice. This does not mean that cooperative strategies should
not be used, but even cooperative strategies are simply means to
achieve one's desired ends most effectively.
The expectation that American society will be able to agree on spe-
cific outcomes and directions based on shared rational principles de-
rived from a common set of values ignores the obvious fact that
members of our society hold very different beliefs. We have numerous
individual points of departure premised on our distinct systems of val-
uation concerning fundamental principles. The adversary system is
an integral tool through which our democracy achieves what Pound
called "a systematic adjustment of relations."77 The adversary system
both reflects and serves the culture of the very diverse and rationally
incommensurable political, social, economic and moral systems that
comprise our nation.
Part of this expanded need relates to the vastly increased access to
the instrumentalities of social choice by an array of interests diver-
gent in character from those that traditionally dominated American
discourse. For convenience these are lumped under such headings as
difference, diversity and multiculturalism.7 8 "Difference," for exam-
ple, has become a catchphrase in the past decade but many advocates
of difference fail to think about the implications of the expansion in
cultural beliefs that is implied by difference. Difference almost inevi-
tably means more disputes over values, not fewer, in part because dif-
ference is less an abstract and neutral concept than an explicit or
implicit demand. Difference represents more demands for inclusion,
and such demands are resisted by those who are already in control of
the context that would be affected negatively by the legitimacy of the
particular "difference." Difference means more claims to power and
participation. Difference means more competing interest groups de-
fending themselves against other groups and trying to obtain what
they consider is their rightful share of social and economic power and
expanded access to opportunities. In making this statement the impli-
cation is not that the challenges created by most of the values re-
flected in difference are bad - simply that they are such powerful
challenges to others' critical values and perceived entitlements that
conflicts and resistance by those potentially affected are inevitable.
77. See Pound, supra note 19, at 3.
78. 'Difference" is defined as "being different; dissimilarity," and as "an instance or
point of dissimilarity." RNDOM HousE WEBSTER's UNABRIDGED DIcTioNARY 551
(2d ed. 1997). To "differ" is "to be unlike, dissimilar, or distinct in nature or quali-
ties.. . ." Id. Although the "difference movement" seeks to persuade people to
have a greater appreciation for dissimilarity and unlikeness, this is obviously
something that is very difficult for many people - both as a general matter and in
relation to dissimilarities they consider undesirable and threatening.
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The emergence of heightened levels of conflict over basic values is
in many ways a positive process. It represents a healthy opening up of
the traditional orthodoxy of a dominant culture that had been long
able to suppress competing voices. Institutions organize themselves
in ways that seek to self-perpetuate. All institutions do this and his-
tory has taught us that those who dominate the institutions of power
and benefit most from the distributive allocations operate the political
system in ways that cement their control. 79 Therefore, the newly
opened process represents an expansion of the availability of effective
advocates arguing on behalf of interests that had been systematically
excluded from meaningful participation in political and economic
processes. It represents the extension of access to advocates to those
who were previously powerless.
Why is adversarial access a social imperative? Why is ordered con-
flict so important in our American cultural moment? This analysis
begins with a sense of who we are and what we seek. We are a loosely
definable "community" of widely divergent interests and multiple cen-
ters of power. We are in fact far more a federation of loosely related
and competing communities of interest than a unified and harmonious
polity. Our system is based far more on conflict, argument, self-inter-
est and diffusion of power than on rational discourse. Self-interest
means that we each begin our reasoning from a different point of de-
parture, i.e., one dominated by our specific interest in a particular out-
come. Advocacy in a complex democracy derives from the fact that
there is at best a lowest common denominator level of consensus in
any area of basic values.
In such a political system, there can therefore be no single rational
"right" answer in virtually any area of consequence, but only negoti-
ated or imposed political answers. As Madison indicated, neither dic-
tatorial imposition of a single view or a propagandistic brainwashing
in acceptable political thinking are desirable nor viable options.SO
This fact alone distinguishes us from more homogenous communities
in which customary legal regimes were capable of operating on a small
scale, in which shared values and a unifying authority mediated dis-
course, values, and decision-making. The advocate's voice is needed in
our ordering of conflict because inherent within virtually any concep-
tion of "good" in a functioning political system is the inevitability that
it will be in conflict, or at least a strong tension, with other concep-
tions. The validity and choice of a substantive conception of the good
79. Arthur Brown notes: "Institutions are social systems that shape not only our ac-
tions but our values and dispositions .... [T]o the extent that institutions shape
our values and dispositions they can make us stupid... [and] stupidity deprives
us of our humanity." Arthur Brown, Foreword to DONNA H. KERR, BAmERS TO
INTEGRITY: MODERN MODES OF KNOWLEDGE UTILIZATION, at x (1984).
80. See FEDERALIST, supra note 9.
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at any particular moment therefore represents only a point in an
ongoing dialectical process rather than a collectively agreed absolute.
Our democratic system of enormous diversity, conflicting funda-
mental values, and diffuse clusters of power, can therefore function
effectively only through the voices of powerful advocates and wise
judges. Locke observed that law is what helps to hold the system to-
gether against individual efforts to take advantage of others.sl Jerold
Auerbach reminded us that, even in the midst of rhetoric about the
evils of the adversary system and the need for alternatives, few people
would really want to function in a system where we lacked the ability
to have our views forcefully argued on our behalf and judgments en-
forced by legal institutions.8 2 This is because we know we stand on
feet of clay but cannot afford to admit their brittleness. Daniel Boor-
stin described our quandary:
[The mystery... of law in modern society... [is] [blow [to] retain any belief
in the immanence of law, in its superiority to our individual, temporary needs,
after we have adopted a whole-hearted modern belief in its instrumentality?
How continue to believe that something about our law is changeless after we
have discovered that it may be infinitely plastic? How believe that in some
sense the basic laws of society are given us by God, after we have become
convinced that we have given them to ourselves.
8 3
The role of the lawyer in this highly vulnerable and assailable pro-
cess is to be an advocate within a complex system whose competing
interests will never be brought into complete balance. The role of the
judge is to protect and apply the system's core principles and to man-
age the rate and quality of change. The role of the legislator is to mea-
sure the system's needs with some degree of accuracy, and to use the
legislative process to offer access to disputants and to adjust laws to
deal with more important ends. Such a system is able to avoid revolu-
tion or extreme repression only by providing access to the legal pro-
cess and by instilling the belief that a grievant's position will be fairly
heard. At the center of this system is the expectation that each com-
peting interest is provided a fair chance at prevailing through access
to democratic institutions. Deprived of that option, the Social Con-
tract disintegrates. Locke understood the necessity that people see
their positions as capable of being considered in the rule of law. The
point is not that there is any guarantee of success, but that due pro-
cess is accorded. This has a tendency to mute and defuse the explo-
siveness of conflict.8 4
Yet the fairness of the judicial and legislative elements of the pro-
cess is not guaranteed or consistently applied. There are tragic ineq-
uities and abuses that make the adversary system a travesty in too
81. See LocKE, supra note 21, at 67-68.
82. See AUERBACH, JUSTICE WrrHouT LAw?, supra note 21.
83. DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE DECLINE OF RADICALISi 75-76 (1969).
84. See LocKE, supra note 21.
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many respects. The most basic failure is in the lack of true adversari-
ness in the area of criminal justice. The injustices of our justice sys-
tem are allowed to continue, in part because we are afraid to push for
the required changes. Similarly, a great gap exists between the rheto-
ric of justice and its reality, particularly when the system deals with
the poor and helpless in our society. In considering David Cole's re-
cent work on disparate treatment of racial minorities in the criminal
justice system, Stephen Gillers noted: "In theory, the Constitution
guarantees indigent defendants effective counsel. In reality, Supreme
Court rulings have allowed judges to treat lawyers as effective even
when they conduct no investigation, fail to cross-examine crucial wit-
nesses, sleep during testimony or come to court drunk."8 5
While the examples Gillers mentions are relatively exceptional, the
quality of representation afforded most defendants in criminal cases is
abysmal. One reason we hide from such knowledge is that
this close relation between knowing and [thus being morally responsible for]
doing can help us to interpret one cause of the fear of knowing as deeply a fear
of doing, a fear of the consequences that flow from knowing, a fear of its dan-
gerous responsibilities. Often it is better not to know, because if you did
know, then you would have to act and stick your neck out.8 6
In thinking about things we know are wrong but choose not to deal
with, consider, for example, the paucity of resources available to a de-
fense attorney in a murder case where the defendant was in school
several miles away from the site of the killing when the crime was
committed but still remained in jail for two years. His assigned public
defender was responsible for twenty-five cases at a time, with twelve
of them murder defenses in which prosecutors were asking for the
death penalty. The attorney's office had a single investigator shared
by four other lawyers, all of whom had similar caseloads.8 7 Most ex-
perienced litigators would strongly assert that it is impossible to do a
competent, much less zealous job in that situation. Lest we dismiss
this situation as exceptional, compare this with the grossly inade-
quate level of assistance provided death row inmates in Florida who
are appealing their convictions, a system described as a sham.8
85. Stephen Gillers, The Double Standard: Inequality in Criminal Justice May Be a
Good Thing for the Favored Classes, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 21, 1999, at A13; see DAVID
COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM (1999).
86. ABRAHAM H. MASLOW, TOWARD A PSYCHOLOGY OF BEING 157-58 (2d ed. 1968).
87. See Mike Robinson, Chicago Teenager Jailed for Months Even Though He Had a
Perfect Alibi, THE PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), May 22, 1999, at 8A.
88. See Marcia Coyle, Suit: Death Defense is a Sham: Claim is Fla. Provides Lawyers
But Makes It So They Can't Save Inmates, NAT'L L. J., Dec. 21, 1998, at Al.
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Additionally, consider the level of representation provided for peo-
ple charged with crimes in Texas.8 9 Bob Herbert reported in the New
York Times that:
It is not uncommon for indigent defendants, some of whom are innocent, to
languish in jail for months before a lawyer is appointed to represent them.
Many Texas counties have no procedure for the appointment of counsel before
an indictment is returned. A court-appointed lawyer in Brownsville who met
his client for the first time while a jury was being selected failed to present
evidence during the trial that the man was incarcerated at the time he was
supposed to have raped a child. The man was convicted, sentenced to life in
prison and served five years before a Federal judge ordered him released. A
severely mentally ill man accused of punching his grandfather in the arm
spent four years in jail awaiting trial in Hidalgo County. A man convicted of
murder spent 10 harrowing years on death row before a volunteer attorney
investigated his alibi and won his release.9 0
The barely hidden truth in these tragedies reflects a far darker
part of ourselves than our fear of facing ourselves and our hypocrisy.
That dark side has to do with how we want the system to deal with the
marginal and powerless. The most frightening aspect of this system is
that it is exactly how we want governmental power to be exercised in
order to keep the "underclass" in its "proper" place. Our failure to pro-
vide an even minimally adequate quality of representation to people
from whom we extract freedom and life represents one of the main
junctures at which we want the adversary system to fail in its pro-
fessed ideals. It is how we want blacks, Hispanics, and the poor and
powerless to be treated, in part because we fear them. Because of this
injustice, when I speak of the "virtue" of ordered conflict, I am not
implying that it achieves its full potential in this respect. As reflected
in a recent article, my premise is that critical areas of continuing in-
justice exist in which we need far more ordered conflict of a signifi-
cantly more honest nature and greater access to higher quality
advocates than is found throughout the criminal justice system.9 1
VI. A PERIOD OF INTENSIFYING SOCIAL CONFLICT AND
SEARCH FOR IDENTITY
It is difficult to know what path society is taking because the tradi-
tional American community is almost mythic, both in terms of its as-
89. See Bob Herbert, Defending the Status Quo, N.Y. TIms, June 17, 1999, at A31.
Herbert discusses proposed "reforms" in Texas. He concludes, stating "[blut for
some folks in Texas the idea of providing even minimal constitutional protections
for poor defendants is going a step too far. And one of those folks appears to be
that beacon of compassionate conservatism - you've heard of him - George W.
Bush."
90. Id.
91. See David Barnhizer, Princes of Darkness and Angels of Light: The Soul of the
American Lawyer, 14 NoTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. PoiY 371 (2000) [herein-
after Barphizer, Princes].
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sumed proportions and its actual historical existence. While some will
nostalgically recall a "golden age" of a fair and just America, this per-
spective depends upon who you were at the time. Much like a feudal
society, the traditional conception of community was only able to exist
in a world where people knew the limits of their assigned roles, knew
their "place," and knew how to "steppinfetchit" for their masters. Wo-
men, blacks and other denigrated minorities, gays and lesbians, the
physically and emotionally disabled, poor people, and many others all
"knew their place" in a social structure comprised of clearly defined
status and hierarchy. They lacked the legally recognized "voice" re-
quired to participate meaningfully in the debate over the allocation of
social goods or to speak strongly and collectively against the injustices
that characterized their treatment. This silencing of the disadvan-
taged and marginal, and the relegation of women to stereotyped gen-
der roles has disappeared or at least dissipated over the past few
decades.
The speed of the changes and the extent of the opening of political
discourse to suppressed interests have stunned society. The conse-
quences of this transformation are now striking the American commu-
nity with an extraordinary and relentless rapidity. Many are reacting
in protest against this "social revolution." The Reverend Tim LaHaye
warned that:
[AImoral humanists have moved in, until they control our nation's destiny and
are seeking to separate her from God. This is particularly true of our judges, a
high percentage of whom make humanistic decisions. Because most judge-
ships are appointed positions, it will take several years to change that picture.
The only way to bring morality back into our judicial system is to elect strong,
pro-moral candidates to all federal offices, particularly in the key position of
president.9 2
The rules have changed irreversibly, and the discourse is far more
inclusive. Unsurprisingly, because the issues brought into this dis-
course by the new participants are so volatile and deeply felt, and so
vehemently opposed by those at whom they are aimed, it is an aggres-
sive, strategic, and in many ways irrational discourse. Nor is there
any internal consistency or connection between the adherents of the
newly emerging positions. The advocates of the socially and politically
avant-garde do not represent a coherent movement with a common
strategy as much as a kaleidoscope of widely divergent activists ad-
vancing their specific agendas. The common threads are primarily
92. LAHAYE, supra note 74, at 20. See Aric Press & Ann McDaniel, Judging the
Judges: The Courts are Being Re-created in Reagan's Image, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 14,
1985, at A73 (describing President Reagan's strategy to create a federal court
that reflected his supporters' views on race, affirmative action, and abortion).
"Unable to win Congress over to its views on social issues, the administration has
pinned its hopes on the courts. And it has done so with no apparent irony, de-
spite the longtime insistence of conservatives that courts are the wrong place to
make policy." Id.
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change, demand for a voice, desire for inclusion, and insistence on a
share of power. The various advocates are just as likely to be in con-
flict with another newly emergent interest group that is intent on hav-
ing its own positions heard and on lodging its claim to social goods.
The conflicts take on a more intense character, because the demands
for inclusion and respect are grounded in the language of protest, ac-
tivism, and insistence on greater access to the conditions and benefits
of power that interest group advocates believe have been denied them
by the previous "community."93
Rather than having a reasoned debate based on sound evidence,
interest groups on all sides are engaging in wars of conflicting stereo-
types. This is unsurprising because the issues being advocated are a
complex mixture of incompatible premises and value systems which
are intellectually and emotionally incompatible. It would take a polit-
ical "Philosopher's Stone" to resolve the challenges. Lacking that
magic, we resort to stereotypes. In Propaganda, Jacques Ellul re-
minded us that:
A stereotype is a seeming value judgment, acquired by belonging to a
group, without any intellectual labor .... The stereotype arises from feelings
one has for one's own group, or against the "out-group". Man attaches himself
passionately to the values represented by his group and rejects the cliches of
the out-groups .... The stereotype,... helps man to avoid thinking, to take a
personal position, to form his own opinion.9 4
Maxine Greene warned that slogans and propaganda have re-
placed intelligent dialogue. She stated that slogans are, "rallying
symbols" that "in no sense describe what actually exists, yet they are
taken - wishfully or desperately - to be generalizations or state-
ments of fact."95 Legitimate criticism easily slides toward fanaticism,
and many of the most important social disputes have drifted in some
ways toward the extremes. This was Michael Sandel's point when he
described the current liberal and conservative debate as failing to
"speak to the two concerns at the heart of our discontent."96 Gabriel
Marcel placed what is occurring in America in a context of fanaticism,
reminding us of the improbability of effective discourse. Marcel wrote
that: "[tihe first... observation to be made is that the fanatic never
sees himself as a fanatic; it is only the non-fanatic who can recognize
him as a fanatic; so that when this judgment, or this accusation, is
93. See, e.g., ERic HOFFER, THE TRUE BELIEVER: THOUGHTS ON THE NATURE OF MASS
MoVEMmrs (1951). Therein, he discusses how the "fault finding man of words"
attacks a dominant orthodoxy in order to undermine its perceived legitimacy and
hold on power. Id. at 132.
94. JACQuEs ELLuL, PROPAGANDA 163, n.3 (Konrad Kellen & Jean Lerner trans., Al-
fred A. Knopf, Inc. 1965) [hereinafter PROPAGANDA].
95. GREEmm, supra note 24, at 70.
96. Sandel, supra note 46, at 57-58.
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made the fanatic can always say that he is misunderstood and
slandered."9 7
Russell Jacoby approached this dilemma by criticizing the applica-
tion of the concept of multiculturalism. He discusses what he consid-
ers abuses of the idea of multiculturalism.98 Jacoby criticized not the
idea of multiculturalism but its application, observing that:
The ideas of multiculturalism, cultural pluralism and diversity turn sacro-
sanct. They become blank checks payable to anyone in any amount, lacking
meaning or content. They not only suggest a politics, but often replace polit-
ics. However, even with adjectives like radical or transformative attached,
what politics do they designate? Apart from the wish to include more voices in
the curriculum or different faces at the office, no vision drives multicultural-
ism.... The rise of multiculturalism correlates with the decline of utopia, an
index of the exhaustion of political thinking.9 9
This battle of stereotypes is integral to conflicts seeking change
and the reallocation of power. People resist change and surrendering
the benefits they already possess. Part of the problem is inertia, but
another is our inability or refusal to surrender our beliefs in the valid-
ity of a particular worldview. It is undeniable that most of the more
fundamental demands for inclusion require a shift in the value sys-
tems of those who are in control of the rules of the social system or
who are the primary beneficiaries of its rules of allocation. We do not
want to change our beliefs, rules, or entitlements. Charles Axelrod
offered this insight:
Ideas do not float freely among people; they become rooted in commitments,
ossified and sustained within intellectual communities; they are cradled
among avid sponsors and defenders whose work relies on their stability. Thus
the tension of discourse refers not merely to the presence of one language ad-
dressing (and straining) another, but to the presence of one language address-
ing the inertia of another. 1 0 0
If this problem of inertia and allegiance to existing positions and
values - regardless of contrary evidence - accurately characterizes
even the academic and intellectual communities what does it portend
for communities of interest that lack commitments to such governing
values as truth and innovation? The situation may well be hopeless
from the perspective of our ability to achieve truth-based solutions to
the most critical disputes. Just how dangerous the battles over stereo-
typed interest group agendas are to our ability to preserve the integ-
rity of our political community can be understood through reference to
Hobbes's six factors presented earlier.lOl
97. GABRIEL MARCEL, MAN AGAINST MASS SOCIETY 136-37 (1969).
98. See RUSSELL JACOBY, THE END OF UTOPIA: POLITICS AND CULTURE IN AN AGE OF
APATHY (1999).
99. Id. at 32.
100. CHARLES AXELROD, STUDIES IN INTELLECTUAL BREAKTHROUGH, FREUD, SIMMEL,
BUBER 2-3 (1979).
101. See HOBBES, supra note 3, at 363-68.
[Vol. 79:657
THE VIRTUE OF ORDERED CONFLICT
1. The belief that every private man is Judge of Good and Evil actions.
2. The belief that whatever a man does against his conscience, is sin.
3. The belief that Faith and Sanctity, are not to be attained by Study and
Reason, but by Supernatural Inspiration or Infusion.
4. The belief that he who has the Sovereign Power is subject to the Civil laws.
5. The belief that every private man has an absolute propriety in his goods:
such as excluded the Right of the Sovereign.
6. The belief that the sovereign power may be divided.1 0 2
Hobbes's first through fifth factors all subordinate the positive will
of the democratic community to a perception of divine intent or to the
primacy of the individual. It takes little imagination to understand
that to the extent that the "right" belief is considered to be divinely
inspired, how will the community's positive laws ever be able to trump
God's revealed will? This helps explain the depth of feeling on the
part of those opposed to abortion, particularly those whose opposition
is based on religious belief. In such a context, no human-made law
can ever be legitimate unless it completely bans or at least severely
restricts abortions. For the most dedicated of anti-abortion protesters,
abortion represents the taking of an innocent human life or the denial
of the spark of divine spirit that God bequeaths us in His own image.
Each is a mortal sin.
Consider the opposing view that a woman's right to control her
body and reproductive processes is a form of individual liberty that
overrides all other considerations and requirements the community
might seek to impose on the individual woman. This relies on the pri-
mary value of individual autonomy, which in turn requires the manip-
ulation of basic concepts of the nature and value of human life. The
only way to avoid the dilemma is to make one value absolute or to
present the fetus as not really representing true life. But the value of
human life is a strong principle that no responsible moral actor will
dispute. If an individual wants to be able to make a moral choice that
does not lead to moral guilt, it is necessary to elevate some other prin-
ciple such as personal autonomy and choice to a higher moral level
than that of human life, or, because many are not comfortable with
this particular rationale, to redefine the factual context in ways that
allow the conclusion that human life is not involved in the exchange -
i.e., "viability."
There is an element of dishonest rationalization in the abortion
dispute in which either micro-community sets its preferred moral
standard in terms consistent with its political agenda. These perspec-
tives must be placed in a context of gender politics and a history in
which many women feel unfairly dominated by the unjust use of male
power. This may allow the setting of priorities that serve the micro-
community's interests but does not resolve the obvious moral conflict.
There can be no agreed upon resolution of such disputes; instead, com-
102. Id.
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peting views and interests strike an uneasy balance. Even the bal-
ance is difficult to achieve. Hobbes feared that the unwillingness to
compromise on fundamental issues of this volatile character due to a
belief that positive laws violated divinely revealed laws would result
in a weak political system. Yet the most powerful and intractable of
our current conflicts derive from such beliefs.
Thinking about Hobbes's six factors creates an appreciation of the
virtue of the adversary system's ritualistic and ordered processes of
conflict resolution. The volatile politico-legal doctrines, including
abortion, affirmative action, takings, and religious establishment dis-
putes are conflicts about which we will not be able to achieve full
agreement. Expansion of the culture's zone of tolerance and willing-
ness to compromise will only occur over time rather than through a
cultural epiphany. It must also be measured in terms of the degree of
penetration of the altered values in society rather than the expecta-
tion that all citizens will change their views. In fact, as more people
begin to gradually shift toward an altered set of values, an intensifica-
tion and even radicalization of the agendas and behaviors of those who
remain opposed may result.
An element of our being able to achieve a degree of compromise is
the provision of an opportunity for disparate voices to be heard rather
than suppressed. If that opportunity is denied or too muted in its
emotional character, it loses its ability to mitigate hostility and inten-
sifies the underlying bitterness. That is arguably what is happening
in response to what political conservatives have labeled "political cor-
rectness" or the assertion that one group's worldview and sensitivities
can be allowed to suppress or trump another's.10 3 Aristotle warned
that a sense of fairness and of justice being served were essential ele-
ments of any decent society.1 0 4 Access to a society's mechanisms of
dispute resolution is part of a perception of at least relative fairness.
Without the perception of fairness being widely held by citizens, the
members of political societies lack the will to cooperate with others
and distrust their political institutions. If this continues too long and
becomes too pervasive, the social glue is not strong enough to prevent
a weakening, or even disintegration, of the political system.
While we will never be able to reach full social compromise on basic
moral positions, the anger created by rigid and unalterable value con-
flicts are major premises that underlie Hobbes's concerns regarding
the weakening of a political community. Loss of the sense of fairness,
103. See, e.g., THE BETRAYAL OF LIBERALISM: HOW THE DISCIPLES OF FREEDOM AND
EQUALITY HELPED FOSTER THE ILLIBERAL POLITICS OF COERCION AND CONTROL
(Hilton Kramer & Roger Kimball, eds., 1999); DINMsH D'SouzA, ILLIBERAL EDUCA-
TION: THE POLITICS OF RACE AND SEX ON CAMPUS (1991); ROGER KIMBALL, TEN-
URED RADICALS: How POLITICS CORRUPTED HIGHER EDUCATION (1998).
104. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 2.
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the feeling by many citizens of being denied access to critical social
goods and opportunities, and the inability or unwillingness to negoti-
ate social compromises have combined to create a period of uncer-
tainty that is profoundly straining the fabric of American society. But
such feelings will remain with us and shift as one position gains power
at the expense of another.
There is a need to protect against concentrations of power. The
Madisonian foundation of our system of government rests on the diffu-
sion of power and the creation of clusters of power that tend to balance
and oppose the natural drift of the most powerful interests toward
dominance. 0 5 If, as Hobbes warns, the belief that God sets a pattern
of divine laws to guide our behavior and regulate the political commu-
nity creates a difficulty for society, the "death of God" trumpeted by
the Enlightenment creates an equivalent dilemma. A fully secular
conception of society in which laws are based solely on the power of
humans to make choices of law without some strong source of external
or divine authority such as natural law or divine inspiration has re-
sulted in a system in which humans lack deep principles of a kind
sufficient to guide their judgments. Daniel Boorstin concluded that:
The discovery, or even the belief that man could make his own laws, was bur-
densome .... [N]early every man knew in his own heart the vagueness of his
own knowledge and the uncertainty of his own wisdom about his society.
Scrupulous men were troubled to think that their society was governed by a
wisdom no greater than their own. 10 6
Many people have little difficulty with making such choices - at
least as long as they are in control of the decision-making processes.
Conservative Republicans railed against the abuse of governmental
power until they moved from the political shadows in the early 1980s
and gained control of the levers of power.lO7 Our most powerful finan-
cial interests long warned of the evils of a world government, but their
"wolf crying" ended as soon as they were successful in creating institu-
tions such as the World Trade Organization that allocated control of
the rules of trade to them. This provided the ability to trump many
conflicting social policies. We are now at the point where globalization
rhetoric has helped work one of history's most significant transfers of
national sovereignty to an international body, and this shift repre-
105. See FEDERALIST, supra note 9, at 56.
106. BooRsTn, supra note 83, at 56.
107. See, e.g., E.J. Dionne, Jr., Liberals Fear New Judicial Activism, THE PLAN
DEALER (Cleveland), July 14, 2000, at 9B. Dionne wrote:
Attacks on "the imperial judiciary" were once the stuff of conservative
arguments against a "liberal activist" Supreme Court. That is about to
change. In a shift that is momentous in historical and political terms,
liberals are beginning to sound alarms about conservative justices using
states' rights and other doctrines to void environmental, economic and
social legislation.
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sents a severe threat to true democratic governance on local and na-
tional levels. Paradoxically, the emergence of extremely powerful
global trade institutions has been regarded by the private financial
interests the institutions serve as a virtue rather than an unmitigated
evil.
The recognition that power requires control of decision-making in-
stitutions and rules has created a competition to occupy the sources of
power and define the rules of decision to ensure that particular inter-
est group preferences are reflected in the choices. This is demon-
strated in the seemingly unrelated situations of the American
judiciary and globalization rhetoric. In his classic book, Power, Adolf
Berle warns that control of institutions is the only way by which peo-
ple can extend their power beyond the limited reach of their fists or
guns.10 Clearly, Berle means that those seeking to capture the abil-
ity to dictate rules to others or to protect themselves against others'
control requires that they gain possession of the institutions that
make and enforce the rules or laws.1 0 9
Justice Rehnquist suggested what almost inevitably happens when
people who possess strong agendas and controlling stereotypes are
successful in their effort to acquire power. Dissenting in Furman v.
Georgia, he quoted from John Stuart Mill's, On Liberty:
The disposition of mankind, whether as rulers or as fellow-citizens, to impose
their own opinions and inclinations as a rule of conduct on others, is so ener-
getically supported by some of the best and by some of the worst feelings inci-
dent to human nature, that it is hardly ever kept under restraint by anything
but want of power.1 1 0
VII. SOCIAL DESPAIR AND ACQUIRING MEANING THROUGH
JOINING A MICRO-COMMUNITY
Another reason behind the intense battle for dominance of a de-
sired stereotype is that, while humans are seeking identity and mean-
ing, they are caught in the grip of an enormously powerful and
faceless society that relegates the vast majority of people to existences
as little more than fungible commodities.I Those who feel they are
108. ADOLF A. BERLE, POWER 92 (1967).
109. See id.
110. 408 U.S. 238, 267 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)(quoting JOHN STuART MILL,
ON LIBERTY 28 (1885)).
111. See MITCH ALBOM, TUESDAYS WITH MORRIE, 124-25 (1997). Albom wrote:
"We've got a form of brainwashing going on in our country," Morrie
sighed. "Do you know how they brainwash people? They repeat some-
thing over and over. And that's what we do in this country. Owning
things is good. More money is good. More property is good. More com-
mercialism is good. More is good. More is good. We repeat it - and
have it repeated to us - over and over until nobody bothers to even
think otherwise. The average person is so fogged up by all this, he has
no perspective on what's really important anymore."
[Vol. 79:657
THE VIRTUE OF ORDERED CONFLICT
being ground beneath the wheel of an inhumane economic and social
system have limited options. These options include rebelling and
seeking an alternative identity outside the system, or accepting their
fate and declining into an emptiness that numerous social philoso-
phers have said lies at the heart of humanity.1 2
Reasons given for our despair and emptiness include the enormous
power, complexity, and contradictory forces of modern society.iis
Walter Lippmann remarked that men have dissolved into "an anony-
mous mass" because they are "without an authentic world, without
provenance or roots;" without, that is to say, "belief and faith that they
can live by."1x4 In two powerful and insightful books, Technological
Society and Propaganda, Jacques Ellul warned of a transformation of
social structure and behavior into what he called technique.115 A gen-
eration ago, Ellul saw this change occurring to the point we are
trapped within a "technological society" that defines and dictates
human behavior and causes a progressive loss of our humanity.'i 6
Confronted by complexity and power beyond imagining, and feel-
ing completely incapable of individually mastering the world, people
can take several possible paths. One path chosen by many is to seek
refuge in powerful institutions that offer a kind of security, legitimacy,
and meaning."i7 The values of General Motors or Nissan are substi-
tuted for personal existential inquiry, and status is acquired through
association. Some seek to achieve some form of individual meaning
and identity. But even the search for individual meaning is often sim-
ply another form of self-deception. Viktor Frankl observed that "there
Id.
112. See, e.g., MARTIN BUBER, BETWEEN MAN AND MAN 158 (Ronald Gregor Smith
trans., The MacMillan Co. 1947).
113. The power and scale of institutional structures is part of the phenomenon of
"technique," which Jacques Ellul describes as shaping modern society. See JAC-
QUES ELLUL, TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY (John Wilkinson trans., Alfred A. Knopf,
Inc. 1964)[hereinafter TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY]. Ellul wrote: "propaganda seeks
to induce action, adherence, and participation-with as little thought as possi-
ble." PROPAGANDA, supra note 94, at 180.
114. WALTER LippmaNN, THE PUBLIC PHmOsOPHY 87 (1956).
115. See TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY, supra note 113; PROPAGANDA, supra note 94.
116. Ellul describes the shift toward specialization and its costs:
Technique is of necessity, and as compensation, our universal language.
It is the fruit of specialization. But this very specialization prevents mu-
tual understanding. Everyone today has his own professional jargon,
modes of thought, and peculiar perception of the world .... The man of
today is no longer able to understand his neighbor because his profession
is his whole life, and the technical specialization of this life has bound
him to live in a closed universe.
TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY, supra note 113, at 132.
117. Consider worker attitudes as reflected in an article by Teresa Dixon Murray. See
Teresa Dixon Murray, Many Workers Have Lost Trust as Firms Close Unexpect-
edly: Corporate Loyalty is Replaced by Corporate Suspicion, Distrust, THE PLAIN
DEALER (Cleveland), July 11, 1999, at D1.
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are various masks and guises under which the existential vacuum ap-
pears. Sometimes the frustrated will to meaning is vicariously com-
pensated for by a will to power, including the most primitive form of
the will to power, the will to money."11 8 Jules Henry described the
tendency toward finding a substitute for true human meaning, stating
that:
The average American has learned to put in place of his inner self a high and
rising standard of living, because technological drivenness can survive as a
cultural configuration only if the drive toward a higher standard of living be-
comes internalized; only if it becomes a moral law, a kind of conscience. 1 1 9
A fascinating possibility exists regarding the inhumanity of the
technological society as it has become linked to our increasingly
globalized economy. The ruthlessness and impersonality of the global-
ized economic entity has become sufficiently manifest that employees
are beginning to understand that there is no longer any real security
for anyone. Traditionally, when companies hired workers they tended
to think of it as an implicit bargain for life in which if the worker
demonstrated loyalty and diligence the company would continue the
employment. In such a culture, loyalty was understandably owed the
company "family."
A recent report in The Plain Dealer described a situation in which
a troubled company enticed employees to stay on the job during reor-
ganization by promising benefits and severance pay. After several
months the company reneged on its promise and declared bankruptcy
while leaving the workers unpaid and bitter. It became clear that the
promises had been part of a deliberate strategy to obtain worker ser-
vices without intending to honor the commitments. Journalist Teresa
Dixon Murray concluded in this article that "[t]ales of corporate be-
trayal like the Builders Square shutdown have had a ripple effect on
all companies, fueling greater cynicism among a work force that al-
ready distrusts employers who seem capable of any degree of ruthless-
ness or inhumanity, as long as the bottom line is protected."i 2 0
Compare this situation with a recent and troubling report on a new
practice of an increasing number of Japanese companies. The compa-
nies are attempting to force long time employees to resign rather than
firing them. This reduces the social costs to the company. Generally
known as committed to life-long employment arrangements, compa-
nies in Japan are altering decades of worker stability with crude os-
tracism of workers they are attempting to force out of jobs through
resignations.i 21 Other workers who have been told that the company
118. ViCrOR E. FRANKL, MANSS SEARCH FOR MEANING 170 (1985).
119. HENRY, supra note 68, at 50.
120. Murray, supra note 117, at D1.
121. See Mark Magnier, Japanese Companies Use Silent Treatment to Force Workers
Out, THE PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), July 25, 1999, at A4.
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no longer plans to keep a particular worker have increasingly begun to
show their loyalty to the company by engaging in "shunning behavior"
in which they refuse to eat with or talk to the employee.12 2 The aim is
that the employee will become so dismayed at being shunned that he
will quit rather than being fired or laid off. This saves the company
the cost of social benefits, and losing face. 123 These trends tell us that
even if we want the security of comfortable institutions that will act as
our "mothers" for life, such safe havens are disappearing. How we will
adapt to the loss of institutional security is still an open question.
We have seen the disintegration of an idyllic and somewhat illu-
sory "community" into a myriad of small and independent special-in-
terest micro-communities. This phenomenon now dominates our
social and political landscapes. The "micro-communities" have become
vital sources of meaning and identity for people trapped in an im-
mense and powerful system. Erich Fromm describes our search for
some semblance of identity in a faceless state as one in which:
the individual ceases to be himself, he adopts entirely the kind of personality
offered to him by cultural patterns; and he therefore becomes exactly as all
others are and as they expect him to be. The discrepancy between "r" and the
world disappears and with it the conscious fear of aloneness and power-
lessness. 12 4
He continues: "The person who gives up his individual self and be-
comes an automaton, identical with millions of other automatons
around him, need not feel alone and anxious any more. But the price
he pays, however, is high; it is the loss of his self."125
While the movement toward the technological society has intensi-
fied since Ellul presented his prescient insights, so has the rebellion
against this society's dehumanizing conditions. We may be seeing a
counter-revolution in terms of people awakening to their own respon-
sibility for action. More likely, however, the rise in special interest
micro-communities is little more than a substitute for the loss of insti-
tutional loyalty. It is a method by which we select a belief system that
gives us a sense of community, identity and meaning. This rebellion
against technocratic and bureaucratic meaninglessness and the
search for a niche in which one can find substitute meaning plays a
significant role in the conflicts that now characterize our social inter-
actions. Mediating this rebellion without allowing the system to col-
lapse under the stresses generated by the conflict is a vital part of the
adversary system.
In seeking to rebel against this effect of modern society, many peo-
ple have created associations clustered around a core of powerful in-
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. ERICH FRo=i, ESCAPE FRoM FREEDOM 208-09 (1941).
125. Id. at 209.
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terests and beliefs. In this way, they exist and have a sense of
meaning and power. The problem, however, is that they must hold to
these associations and beliefs with a death grip, because it is all that
provides them with a sense of meaning and life. The ability to compro-
mise and change is very limited in such a system, because the special
interest micro-communities are grounded on the need to believe in
something in order to simplify a world that seems out of control. The
need for association and group meaning extends to agreeing with fel-
low "true believers" in order to keep the association strong and
supportive.
A serious problem for the adversary system is that the micro-com-
munities that populate our political landscape are not internally criti-
cal and self-aware as opposed to being externally directed. They tend
to react to perceived external threats rather than being aimed at per-
sonal growth and individual meaning. This reaction produces inevita-
ble conflict with other communities of interest whose members oppose
(or simply do not fully acknowledge) the desirability of the particular
interest group's positions. In fact, the beliefs and identity of a micro-
community of interest are largely created and sustained by the con-
flicts with other interest groups through these reactive relationships.
In an odd way, each needs the other. Rather than being a threat, the
energy and focus created by the conflict helps define and sustain each
interest group.
One way of coping with the facelessness of our world is to adopt a
cause in which we believe deeply. It is important that enough other
people share the cause so that it achieves the critical mass needed to
become a micro-community to which we can pledge allegiance and de-
rive meaning. The shift to religious fundamentalism, some forms of
environmental activism, and even the rise of neo-Nazi organizations
are a few examples of this phenomenon. Such micro-communities are
now found everywhere.
In a social system that possesses the amount of discord that now is
represented in our many micro-communities committed to advocating
their agendas, the need for reasoned dialogue is great, but to expect it
is unrealistic. Law and legal doctrine are after all only another form
of politics, and much of our discourse is rationally inadequate and fac-
tually dishonest. The democratic dream of rational, truth-based dis-
course is being honored only in the breach. This ensures that choices
of the ultimate truths on which our political-legal doctrines are
grounded will be made through the strategic manipulation of political
processes, regardless of the consequences.
People have a need to believe in something they see as higher or
better than themselves. Of course, while we innocently assume this
means a benign power, the meaning of what is higher and better has
been submerged in the idea of power itself. In the twentieth century
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alone, people committed atrocities almost without number beneath
the banners of Nazism, Marxism, racial and ethnic superiority, relig-
ion, and other "isms" that justified death, destruction and subjugation
of others in exchange for committing and losing themselves to a cause.
Many are able to believe in only money, celebrity, and power. They
lack any internal system that helps them to define individual integ-
rity. The worship of celebrity and wealth has replaced principled and
heroic behavior as something worth patterning one's behavior after.
Daniel Boorstin remarked that "[w]e see greatness as an illusion; or, if
it does exist, we suspect we know its secret. We look with knowing
disillusionment on our admiration for historical figures who used to
embody greatness." 126
Money, celebrity and power have become dominant surrogates for
inner principle and wisdom. They are icons that offer visible manifes-
tations of power and success. This obsession with money, celebrity
and power has captured the soul of American culture. For far too
many, they transmit our "worth" to others. A reason for this domi-
nance is that we prize financial security and status much more than
we desire freedom. Although our intellectual rhetoric suggests other-
wise, real freedom is an obligation that cannot coexist with license.
Freedom carries within it a personal responsibility and accountability
that we instinctively avoid. Peter Berger challenged our rhetoric of
freedom and concluded that "most of the time we ourselves desire just
that which society expects of us. We want to obey the rules. We want
the parts that society has assigned to us." 12 7 Berger's insight implies
that the system of unprincipled surrogates corrupts all other systems
and preempts the moral field.128 In such a context, disputes will be
continual. Truth will be an inconvenience if it is not on your side or a
weapon of the moment if it is. There must be a strong mechanism for
dealing with conflict - strength usefully thought of as Friedman's "fist
126. DANIEL J. BOORSTiN, THE IhMAGE: A GUIDE TO PSEUDO-EVENTs IN AMERCA 51
(1961).
127. PETER BERGER, INVITATION TO SOCIOLOGY: A HUtmNISTIC PERSPECTWE 93 (1963).
Berger describes the repressive subtleties of an orthodoxy. "Very potent and si-
multaneously very subtle mechanisms of control are constantly brought to bear
upon the actual or potential deviant. These are the mechanisms of persuasion,
ridicule, gossip and opprobrium." Id. at 11.
128. Edward Wilson captures some of our hypocrisy in the context of altruism, stating
that:
Generosity without hope of reciprocation is the rarest and most cher-
ished of human behaviors, subtle and difficult to define, distributed in a
highly selective pattern, surrounded by ritual and circumstance, and
honored by medallions and emotional orations. We sanctify true altru-
ism in order to reward it and thus to make it less than true, and by that
means to promote its recurrence in others. Human altruism, in short, is
riddled to its foundations with the expected mammalian ambivalence.
EDwARD 0. WILSON, ON HuiAN NATURE 155 (1978).
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inside the velvet glove."129 The mechanism must be strong, or we will
not achieve agreement in the most volatile areas of conflict.
The intensity of the conflict and the dishonesty of our discourse are
created because fundamental values are being threatened or advo-
cated. In almost every situation, this conflict resembles a series of
zero-sum games in which if one interest group appears to advance,
another perceives itself as losing. Even though economists and others
can demonstrate that the total system tends to benefit collectively
over some period of time, this holds no meaning to those who lose
something they cherish or fear a shift in the balance of power. A frank
assessment suggests that much of what we are experiencing is a zero-
sum game in which the entitlements of some are lessened as those of
others increase. Given that the existing allocations have been taken
for granted as just entitlements by the current beneficiaries and that
few of those beneficiaries feel responsible for the past injustices or un-
fair allocations being complained of by the relevant interest group,
this creates a sense of comparative injustice that further disrupts our
political community. The competing feelings of unjust distribution
and redistribution of the system's benefits can perhaps be dealt with
or muted but not fully dissipated.13o
VIII. HOW DOCTRINE HELPS SHAPE AND BALANCE OUR
POLITICAL SYSTEM
The main battleground for competing interests is increasingly
found in the struggle to define, create, and control the doctrinal rules
that implement our judgments about particular ultimate truths. It is
these rules and their interpretations that allocate, preserve, and real-
locate power. Judicial doctrines absorb other critical aspects of social,
economic, and political values to form interacting systems that are im-
portant to human societies. These categories reveal that doctrines in-
fluence and reflect virtually every level of human political activity and
are an integral aspect of the ability of the Rule of Law to sustain our
political system. The categories of elemental doctrines that play fun-
damental roles in the successful operation of the Rule of Law are out-
lined below. These categories are offered as a preliminary construct
and are not exhaustive. Nor is the listing necessarily internally coher-
ent. The categories are offered primarily as ideas about how we might
begin to better understand judicial doctrine as a system that is a vital
129. FRIEDMAN, supra note 70, at 257. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE HORIZONTAL
SociE' (1999). In his latest work, Friedman discusses a diverse range of issues,
beginning with what he refers to as the rise of "identity wars and identity polit-
ics". Id. at vii.
130. See, for example, the collection of thoughts on the necessity for apologies and
reparations for alleged violations of human justice in WHEN SORRY IsN'T ENOUGH
(Roy L. Brooks ed., 1999).
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element of our social structure and our process of dialogue and dispu-
tation. Doctrine is sketched here in an overarching, systemic sense,
rather than from within particular doctrines.
But why is the special nature of ultimate truths and maintaining
the fictions we use to sustain our beliefs so important in judicial deci-
sion-making and the choice and application of legal doctrine? In part
it is because the factual, rational, philosophical, and scientific indeter-
minacy of the common law means that the judiciary cannot deal with
complex legal situations in neat scientific compartments. The judicial
task involves interpretation, analysis, distinction, comparison, anal-
ogy, identification of hierarchies of principle, divination of purpose
and intent, prediction, judgment, and making choices. These patterns
of thought emerge from the nature of law cases combined with the role
of judges. Legal cases of any complexity are incompatible mixtures of
fact, rationality, values, judgment, analogy, scientific assumption,
metaphysics, and doctrinal principle.
It is within this context that the judge must exercise judgment to
answer many questions that cannot be scientifically or rationally an-
swered. The subject matter of legal doctrine involves factors that re-
sist being compressed into conveniently rational compartments.
These kinds of incommensurable and incompressible elements make
up the core essences of the difficult doctrines through which we seek
to balance and resolve our fundamental value conflicts. They are im-
portant aspects of doctrinal formulation. Because "law-knowledge" in-
volves characteristics that are often ephemeral, internal and
subjective, political, authoritarian, aesthetic, and value-laden, it al-
lows wide latitude for defensible or at least arguable visions of the
good. In many instances, a priori principles are little more than pre-
ferred assertions worked out in accordance with an individual's sense
of the kind of society or legal system he or she prefers and is seeking to
create or defend. Often we are unaware these assertions are choices
rather than truths.
Doctrine is a form of "soft knowledge."1 3 1 The core language of law
is malleable and adaptive, making it a perfect ground for conflicts over
interpretations. 32 Consider the competing linguistic concepts im-
131. See Barnhizer, Prophets, supra note 48; see also JAMms B. CONANT, Two MODES OF
THOUGHT 44 (1964)(quoting from CMUSTOPHER LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES
ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS (1871))("Law, considered as a science, consists of cer-
tain principles or doctrines. To have such a mastery of these as to be able to
apply them with constant facility to the ever-tangled skein . . . should be the
business of every earnest student of the law.").
132. See EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 4 (1949). Levi
remarked:
The categories used in the legal process must be left ambiguous in order
to permit the infusion of new ideas .... Furthermore, agreement on any
other basis would be impossible. In this manner the laws come to ex-
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plicit in a system of knowledge based on equal protection, due process,
good faith, mens rea, knowing action, equity, malice, proximate cause,
foreseeability, discretion, and reasonableness of belief. These con-
cepts are highly elastic and pliable. This character allows flexible and
adaptive responses to changing conditions but also threatens the sys-
tem. The threat arises because the language of core legal doctrines
permits great interpretive latitude that can result in a too rapid
change that threatens either the perceived integrity of the system or
allows a critical rule to be captured by a special interest.1 3 3 These
disputes are managed by the adversary system in what has been de-
scribed in this essay as ordered conflict.
The doctrinal structure set out below represents a system that es-
tablishes the operating terms of the political order as it uses law and
legal process to achieve its diverse goals. Doctrine is thus inescapably
political.1 3 4 Advocates for competing positions within the American
political environment have recognized the shaping effects of legal doc-
trines. They are competing for dominance of the language and control
of the manipulative power of legal institutions, including the judicial
system.1 35 This article concentrates on the confluence of the political
and systemic functions of doctrine - and the specific choices of judges
- because of the importance of this unique political aspect of the oper-
ation of the common law device as an indispensable aspect of the
American democratic system. As judges create, deflect, define and re-
fine the doctrines that allocate social goods and power, those who ben-
efit from particular interpretations have shown increasingly limited
tolerance for positions that would lessen their own advantage, deny
them access, distribute rewards to their interest group, or interfere
with particular political agendas. The tension is inescapable and is in
many ways essential.
The legal system intersects with the allocation, access to, and ap-
plication of social power. "After all," Friedman said:
press the ideas of the community and even when written in general
terms, in statute or constitution, are molded for the specific case.
Id. Levi continued, stating that "[t]he law forum is the most explicit demonstra-
tion of the mechanism required for a moving classification system. The folklore of
law may choose to ignore the imperfections in legal reasoning, but the law forum
itself has taken care of them." Id.
133. Francis Bacon observed that judicial decisions are inherently and appropriately
limited to the "immediate cause." "It were infinite for the law to judge the causes
of causes, and their impulsions one of another: therefore it contenteth itself with
the immediate cause; and judgeth of acts by that, without looking to any further
degree." FRANcIS BACON, THE ELEMENTS OF THE COMMON LAWES OF ENGLAND:
THE MAXIMES OF THE LAW, REGULA 1 (1630).
134. "Doctrine" is defined as "a particular principle, position, or policy taught or advo-
cated, as of a religion or government." RANDOM HOUSE DIcTIoNARY, supra note
78, at 578.
135. See LAHAYE, supra note 74.
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it is through law, legal institutions, and legal processes that customs and
ideas take on a more permanent, rigid form.... The legal system is a struc-
ture. It has shape and form. It lasts. It is visible. It sets up fields of force. It
affects ways of thinking. When practices, habits, and custom turn into law,
they tend to become stronger, more fixed, more explicit.
1 3 6
One of the most important although subtle aspects of this interaction
is reflected in the system of choices we call legal doctrine. Doctrine is
not only unconnected idiosyncratic episodes with disparate pieces de-
signed to deal with specific categories of situations. Doctrinal choices
and rules represent a rich system of choice by which a political com-
munity is defined, integrated with ultimate truths assigned a priority
status, and regulated. It is in this manner that power is created and
distributed and consequences occur.
Legal doctrine is, both individually and structurally, a central as-
pect of how distributional goals are achieved, and preserved. This pro-
vides the driving force behind the intense conflicts we are
experiencing. It is in fact a recognition that we are in a society gov-
erned by the Rule of Law, albeit imperfectly and often unjustly. The
wisdom of Aristotle's nascent ideas of distributive and corrective jus-
tice can be realized through the practical emanations of this structure.
All doctrines have teleological functions - i.e., they are chosen, im-
plicitly or explicitly, to achieve ends. Some of these ends and func-
tions are fundamental and vital, while others are essentially trivial
systemic acts involving relatively minor housekeeping. But it is ines-
capable that doctrine is a conclusion, a formula, a hypothesis about
something of importance that supports, and is supported by, a particu-
lar institution or set of institutions. Through their formulations of ele-
mental legal doctrines, judges provide syntheses from which insights
into the nature of practical wisdom (or practical stupidity for that
matter) can be extracted. Because it is goal-oriented, judicial doctrine
is obviously not truly neutral. Judicial doctrines are combinations of
principles, positions, and policies advocated by the judiciary acting as
a critical part of government. Judges, operating within the rules of
choice articulated for a powerful institution with critical functions,
make important choices about values. These choices are advanced in
the form of doctrine, and their acceptance helps to build an orthodox
structure of doctrinal principles.
As advocates of competing interests jockey for advantage, Ameri-
can law and the various institutions that create, apply, and interpret
laws are the battleground for a political civil war.1 3 7 The struggle is
over which versions of ultimate truths will dominate American soci-
ety. To the extent that the issues are ultimate (e.g., abortion, capital
punishment, rights of the political community, and individual rights
136. FRIMDMAN, supra note 70, at 257.
137. See Barnhizer, Prophets, supra note 48, at 156.
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versus those of the community) and are irretrievably thrust into the
sphere of law, the answers cannot be as undeniably obvious. If we
step back from heated rhetoric and assertions of politically correct
"truths," the "rightness" of many claims is not clear, at least not in
terms of their specific consequences when converted into action
backed by the authority of the State. In such a volatile context, how
are judges to know what is right or true and what kinds of values,
standards, norms, and methods are being used to make the choices?
IX. DOCTRINE AS A SYSTEM AND STRUCTURE
Doctrinal structures, and the judicial choices that represent the
mediating linkages between societal needs, institutional capabilities,
and political demands, work to allocate social goods, facilitate critical
decision-making, and sustain the foundational rules of our society.
This structure and these choices combine to generate the roots of our
political system and are critical forces that are simultaneously neces-
sary to a society's stability and which must be challenged by the shift-
ing dynamics of any healthy political community. Remember Pound's
assertion that law should seek both principles of change and stabil-
ity.1 3 8 The doctrinal descriptions offered here constitute a prelimi-
nary and incomplete effort to outline how the principles of change and
stability come together in the context of a healthy adversary
system.1 3 9
The doctrinal system is formed of a wide range of specific elements,
each possessed of critical primary functions. These primary doctrines
include 1) interpretive doctrines, 2) preservative doctrines, 3) doc-
trines that facilitate or allow change, 4) doctrines essential to main-
taining the system's foundation and structural integrity, and 5)
doctrines that provide the sources of legitimacy and from which ema-
nate the required authority necessary to sustain citizens' willingness
to subordinate themselves to the system's decisions. Some of the more
specific doctrinal archetypes include those set out below.
1. Doctrines of Authority -Examples include doctrines of the judi-
cial authority of the common law judge, constitutionally derived
grants of specific jurisdiction and authority, statutory grants of judi-
cial authority, the doctrine of judicial review, the discretion provided
trial judges, and the authority of the Supreme Court.
2. Doctrines of Structure - Illustrative doctrines can be found in
the "check and balance" rules of the federal and state systems, the
idea of the Rule of Law itself, the concept of the adversary system, the
138. See PouND, supra note 58, at 23.
139. See Barnhizer, Prophets, supra note 48 (originally introducing this doctrinal
structure). It is offered here not as a final description but to suggest the diversity
of doctrine and the critical variety of functions doctrine serves.
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law-morality dichotomy, limits on appellate review of both court and
administrative decisions, and the significant discretionary latitude
given trial judges.
3. Doctrines of Values - The Rule of Law, justice as fairness, the
"search for truth," equality and liberty, distributive justice, liberalism
and conservatism, democratic or majoritarian values, and the willing-
ness to recognize the authority of the Supreme Court.
4. Doctrines of System Purpose and Outcome - Achieving final
outcomes, resolving more intense conflicts, preventing unmanageable
hostilities, "doing justice," checking the power of other formal govern-
mental institutions by setting clear bounds, balancing competing in-
terests, redressing abuses, and the use of primarily objective rather
than subjective doctrines.
5. Doctrines of Interpretation - Stare decisis, judicial review, ana-
logical reasoning ("thinking like a judge"), burdens of proof, limits on
appellate review of courts, limits on appellate review of administrative
agencies, harmless error versus reversible error, the rational basis
test regarding legislative acts, case and controversy, ripeness, invidi-
ous discrimination, and inherently suspect categories.
6. Doctrines of Human Nature and Society - Mens rea, the "rea-
sonable person" standard, social contract, utilitarianism, capitalism
and the market economy, socialism and/or Marxism, the welfare state,
the minimal state, the organic state, general welfare doctrines, human
dignity, quality of life, equality, liberty, individualism, progress, and
Social Darwinism.
7. Doctrines of the Function and Nature of Law - To approximate
the "perfect society" or Utopia, apply the law of God, balance compet-
ing interests, resolve disputes, set the minimally necessary frame-
work, sanction and deter those who would harm the community, seek
justice, do what the majority wants, and distribute and redistribute
goods and bads according to some system of desert.
8. Doctrines of Balance - Judicial review, procedural due process,
political questions, ripeness, case and controversy, discretion, jurisdic-
tion, discretionary appellate review, and pluralism.
9. Doctrines of Limits - The law/morality distinction, ripeness,
case and controversy, political questions, precedent, and objective ver-
sus subjective doctrines.
10. Doctrines of System Preservation - Political questions, ripe-
ness, case and controversy, jurisdiction, judicial review of legislative
acts, and appellate review.
11. Doctrines of Change and Adaptation - The evolution of prece-
dent and the grounding in the common law, the adversary system it-
self, judicial notice of legislative facts, judicial discretion, the sources
of judicial authority, the window to "social policy," the principles for
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interpreting legislative history, and the principles of interpreting
history.
12. Doctrines of "Sourcing" of Law and Legal Institutions - The
common law itself, the Constitution, the Federalist Papers, intent of
the Framers, legislation and legislative history, democracy, the ra-
tional fully knowledgeable human, inherent powers, "police powers,"
the community, national defense and security.
X. CONCLUSION: DEMOCRACY, CHANGE, AND CONFLICT
What can analysis of the doctrinal system tell us? Schumpeter ar-
gued that the process of creative destruction is not only inevitable, but
essential for the health of the system.i 40 There is no harmonious and
steady state condition in nature, politics or economics, regardless of
how much we might hope for such an Eden. The idea of the inevitabil-
ity of change and its creative force is captured in Hegel's dialectic in
which a dominant thesis is confronted by an emerging antithesis.' 4 '
The result is a synthesis that is neither thesis nor antithesis. What
we face today in our volatile social and political environment is a di-
verse and overlapping intermixture of theses. The ultimate results of
the collisions between competing beliefs are less important than the
necessity of the continually unfolding syntheses. This intermixture of
theses is essential to the health of the social system and the creatively
destructive process that gives it life. The questions are never an-
swered and there is no finality.
There is great difficulty in drawing clear lines between illegitimate
and destructive conflict and legitimate and necessary conflict. Simi-
larly, illegitimate positions often have to be brought into the sphere of
ordered conflict and exposed to scrutiny in order to create the founda-
tion for change. Certainly this has been true for conflicts over race.
Nor is it particularly important the lines be clearly drawn as opposed
to the disputes being manageable. For many of the most fundamental
and powerfully opposed issues, the lines are drawn intermediately by
judicial and legislative decisions that create and apply legal doctrine.
Even this sorting out of legitimate and illegitimate claims requires the
creation of processes involving the opportunity to have a credible
hearing of one's positions that allows the playing out of social dis-
agreements among the competing interests.
140. See SCHUMPETER, supra note 25.
141. See GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, LECTURES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF HIS-
TORY (John Sibree trans., 1872). Therein, Hegel describes the dialectical nature
of the Idea [consciousness of Freedom] as one where it is "self-determined - that
it assumes successive forms which it successively transcends; and by this very
process of transcending its earlier stages, gains an affirmative, and, in fact, a
richer and more concrete shape.. . ." Id. at 66.
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The importance to the political structure of an acknowledged, cred-
ible and authoritative means of dispute resolution was a main reason
Locke required humans to surrender their inherent rights of self-judg-
ment to the processes of the political community. He observed that
"all private judgment of every particular member being excluded, the
community comes to be umpire, by settled standing rules, indifferent,
and the same to all parties .... -i42 Hobbes would tell us that if this
subordination of personal values and dispute resolution to community
mechanisms and standards of judgment is not done, the community
will never be able to transcend the brutish "state of nature." 43
The Hobbesian conception of human nature is central to examina-
tion of specific doctrinal areas in which courts and elective politics are
in collision. These doctrinal "power points" are used as the analytic
focus, because our nation is increasingly one in which intransigent
special interests across all political persuasions are engaging in an al-
most irrational discourse instead of honest dialogue. The dialogue
and ability to respect others' interests - to a point - is essential for
the strength of workable democratic communities. This does not re-
quire elegant metaphysics, but demands that we open and conduct a
discourse based on common sense and that we recognize that, no mat-
ter how angry we might be, there are approaches and attitudes neces-
sary to the survival and health of our most critical operating
institutions.
Yet the construction of a community whose members agree to
subordinate their right to take individual action to the Rule of Law
does not in fact automatically create substantively just, fair, and
truth-based resolutions of conflicts. Our representations that the le-
gal system's dispute resolution mechanisms are designed to uncover
truth are a necessary fiction that enhances the overall community's
tacit acceptance of the legitimacy of the decisions.1 44 Fiction, hypoc-
risy, and a certain degree of non-critical self-deception are essential
elements of our ability to respect the system and to generally follow its
dictates. As with tort reform, admitting the truth as to the reality of
whose interests are being served is often the enemy of being able to
protect and advance those special interests. Truth would expose the
142. LocKE, supra note 21; see A. JOHN SnSIONS, ON THE EDGE OF ANARcHY: LocKE,
CONSENT, AND THE Lnirrs OF SocxETY (1993).
143. See HOBBES, supra note 3.
144. In response to a lawyer's statement that "[telling the truth in civil litigation] is, of
course, a very attractive proposition. But... while that might be nice in a perfect
world, it is not the way the system operates in litigation in this country," the
indignant court in Monsanto Co. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 593 A.2d 1013
(Del. Super. Ct. 1990) stated that "I am compelled in the strongest way possible
to reject counsel's observations as being so repugnant and so odious to fair
minded people that it can only be considered as anathema to any system of civil
justice under law." But cf. Barnhizer, Princes, supra note 91.
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unfairness and hypocrisy of the system; yet we need hypocrisy for our
institutions to be able to conduct business as usual.14 5
Aristotle captured this idea of implicit hypocrisy more than two
millenia ago in describing the role of the advocate, stating that "you
must render the audience well-disposed to yourself, and ill-disposed to
your opponent; (2) you must magnify and depreciate [make whatever
favors your case seem more important and whatever favors his case
seem less]."146 Plato said the advocate "enchants the minds" of the
courts of law. The advocate's role is far more deceptive than truth-
directed. Nor is the dilemma of recent origin. Plato added that "he
who would be a skillful rhetorician has no need of truth - for that in
courts of law men literally care nothing about truth, but only about
conviction... ."147 But the lack of truth and even more importantly
the unwillingness to pursue truth as a critical precondition of resolv-
ing disputes and obtaining social goods has permeated our entire soci-
ety. In our "progressive" society, truth has increasingly become the
victim of outcome. 148 As undesirable as our "culture of lies" might be,
it represents a largely irreversible phenomenon. Coping with the cul-
ture we have created leaves us with the need for strong dispute resolu-
145. George Gilder stated: "Idealists... always much abominate what they call hypoc-
risy. But hypocrisy - the insincere expression of unfulfilled ideals - is the
means by which the influence of ideals is extended beyond the small circle of true
believers." GEORGE GILDER, WEALTH AND POVERTY 107 (1981).
146. Aristotle, Epilogue, in THE RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE 240 (Lane Cooper ed. &
trans., 1932). Never was this more obvious as is reflected in Simpson defense
team lawyer Gerald Uelman's statement:
Our purpose was to employ every advantage the law permits to enhance
the prospects of our client's acquittal. Our purpose was to utilize every
device and stratagem the law allows to weaken and discredit the prose-
cution's case. The vindication of our client was the beginning, the end,
and the substance of our every effort. Anything less would have been a
violation of our ethical responsibility to faithfully perform the duties of
an attorney-at-law.
Albert W. Alschuler, How to Win the Trial of the Century: The Ethics of Lord
Brougham and the O.J. Simpson Defense Team, 29 McGEORGE L. REV. 291, 293
(1998)(quoting Gerald Uelman).
147. THE WORKS OF PLATO 292, 306 (Irwin Edman ed., 1928); see PETER H. ScHUcK,
THE LIMITs OF LAw: ESSAYS ON DEMOCRATIC GOvERNANCE (2000)(noting particu-
larly Schuck's discussion of legal complexity in Chapter One).
148. Daniel J. Boorstin observes that:
The making of the illusions which flood our experience has become the
business of America, some of its most honest and most necessary and
respectable business. I am thinking not only of advertising and public
relations and political rhetoric, but of all the activities which purport to
inform and comfort and improve and educate and elevate us: the work of
our best journalists, our most enterprising book publishers, our most en-
ergetic manufacturers and merchandisers, our most successful enter-
tainers, our best guides to world travel, and our most influential leaders
in foreign relations.
BOORSTIN, supra note 126, at 5.
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tion systems, ones with a power sufficient to "overawe" competing
interests to the extent sufficient to ensure the decisions, once ren-
dered, are complied with.
Rarely will there be a realistic chance that a complete meeting-of-
the-disputing-minds will take place in a way that the conflicting posi-
tions merge into a jointly agreed on "disputants' truth." Though there
are claims to the contrary, the adversary system is not directed to-
ward ascertaining truth. It is about obtaining and protecting shares
of power for specific interests. One undeniable reality of existing in a
society with so many competing demands is that without widespread
advocacy for the competing interests, those already in possession of
power will dominate the sources and levers of power. While it is easy
to argue that such a condition is unfair and even immoral - and it is
often both - the vital point is that it is inevitable. There is no way to
avoid the continual struggle for power and dominance in complex
human political systems. While we can take steps to improve the pro-
cess, we cannot "fix" the legal system or the roles of lawyers in that
system. We cannot alter basic human nature through teaching people
to be "nice" and cooperative.1 4 9
The adversary system is the primary mechanism for ensuring the
authoritative mediation and resolution of disputes. It does so through
provision of a powerful umpire in the form of a judge or similar source
of ultimate decision-making. It further achieves this goal through cre-
ating the opportunity to have one's position heard. The only poten-
tially legitimate buffer against abuses of power and the ongoing
tendency of interest groups of every sort to seize power to advance
their particular interests (including ones with whose principles I am
in full agreement) is to provide articulate and strong professional
voices for all the competing interests.
Our system will only work through the diffusion of power to ensure
that power does not become concentrated in a single group's hands.
This represents a fundamental principle of the American democ-
racy. 15 0 The irony of this democratic dispersal of power is that diffu-
149. See AUERBACH, JUSTICE WrrHouT LAw?, supra note 21, at 141. Auerbach de-
scribes this occurrence, stating.
The dependence of Americans upon law, and their apprehension about
it, are reciprocal. The exercise of freedom, channeled into the acquisitive
pursuit of wealth, requires the vigorous assertion of individual rights,
which law protects. It also assures incessant conflict between competing
individuals, who are virtually unrestrained by any purpose beyond self-
aggrandizement. The Darwinian jungle is filled with the excitement of
the hunt, but it is a scary place because the hunters simultaneously are
hunted. As Americans pursue their quarry, they need protection (pro-
vided by law) for themselves, and weapons (also provided by law) against
their adversaries.
Id.
150. See FEDERALIST, supra note 9.
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sion of power into a wider variety of formal and informal clusters
increases the probability of interest group conflicts, because it results
in more interests being recognized and empowered. More interests
are accorded legitimacy and rendered capable of joining the fray. This
expansion of the power to compete for greater shares of social goods
requires stronger and more sophisticated mechanisms through which
the inevitable and continual inter-group conflicts can be mediated.
These considerations make it clear that a key function of the adver-
sary system is to protect and sustain the processes through which all
interested people can participate in an effort to be heard. This in-
cludes being given a fair chance at persuading the system's decision-
makers that the interest group's position should prevail or at least be
reasonably infused into a new social synthesis. In fact, as "difference"
increases and becomes a strong social virtue it provides legitimacy to
an ever-increasing range of interests. The result is that our competi-
tiveness is intensifying and expanding its reach as the more diverse
interests each seek their shares of power.
The different interests must have their champions. This critical
responsibility has fallen onto lawyers.151 The lawyer as advocate
plays a critical role in the insertion of beliefs into the discourse being
continually mediated by the legal system. Each of two (or more) dis-
tinct beliefs in a particular area of social controversy may be morally
justifiable from the perspective of the legitimacy of the particular
principle on which it is based, while neither belief, as with the abor-
tion "debate," can really be "proved" as opposed to chosen.152 Our
complex democracy must still function, which requires that the path-
ways of "resolving" disputes must be kept open and accessible. Provid-
ing access for disputing members of the community offers the chance
for an approximation of fairness and justice. It also operates as a re-
lease valve that keeps the pressures within the political system from
becoming so great that they severely weaken or destroy the overall
integrity of the community.15 3
151. See Barnhizer, Princes, supra note 91.
152. See Barnhizer, Prophets, supra note 48.
153. See LocKE, supra note 25.
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